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INTRODUCTION
In December 2010, the British government braced itself for a sudden threat:
Overnight, tens of thousands of people had acquired a weapon called the Low
* Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2014; University of Georgia, M.P.A., B.A., 2010. My
deep gratitude goes to Russell Balikian, Spencer Gilbert, and Ben Cassady for their
contributions during the editing process. I would also like to thank Nicholas
Bramble, Laura DeNardis, and fellow students in my Spring 2011 Access to Know-
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Orbit lon Cannon (LOIC).' The good news for British authorities was that this
"cannon" is not actually a space laser or hardly even a weapon; it is an old diag-
nostic computer program that allows an individual to test a network's capacity
to handle traffic by sending information to the network's servers.2 The bad news
was that a nebulous online hacking collective called Anonymous was successful-
ly encouraging these tens of thousands of people to use this tool to disrupt the
availability of the websites of a few major corporations.3 The program allowed
individuals to participate in organized attempts to overwhelm each company's
servers with information-so much information that those servers could not
process other users' normal requests for access. 4 The goal of this type of assault,
known as a denial-of-service (DOS) attack, is to disrupt a target organization's
online presence for as long as the attacking computers continue to send such
information.5 The immediate consequence of a successful attack is somewhat
anticlimactic: The target organization's website simply fails to load upon re-
quest. Nevertheless, the idea that thousands of nameless, faceless individuals
could have banded together to produce that result adds social significance to
what would otherwise be a purely technical problem.
To Anonymous, a group that considers itself a champion of free speech, the
DOS attacks that it launched that December were symbolic protests conducted
as part of a larger campaign of social activism called Operation Payback.6 The
group targeted PayPal, Visa, and Mastercard, among other entities, to protest
the companies' withdrawal of support services from WikiLeaks, the controver-
1. Devin Dwyer, Foot Soldiers for Wikileaks: 27,ooo Download Attack Software
Overnight, ABC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/
wikileaks-anonymous-cyber-attacks/story?id=2355960; Cahal Milmo & Nigel
Morris, 'Prepare for All-Out Cyber War', INDEPENDENT (Dec. 14, 2010),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/medialonline/prepare-for-allout-cyber-war
-2159567.html.
2. Dwyer, supra note 1; Milmo & Morris, supra note 1.
3. Dwyer, supra note I.
4. The basic design of the Internet, which utilizes a client-server model, makes this
strategy possible. In a client-server exchange, a computer called a server responds
to requests by other client computers once it establishes individual connections
with each client. Accordingly, a server needs various types of finite resources-
processing, memory, and storage capacity-in order to handle clients' requests.
See ETHAN ZUCKERMAN ET AL., BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & Soc'v, DISTRI-
BUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS AGAINST INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND HUMAN
RIGHTS SITES 15 (2oo), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/
cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/2olo-DDoSAttacksHumanRights-andMedia.pdf.
5. See JELENA MIRKOVIC ET AL., INTERNET DENIAL OF SERVICE: ATTACK AND
DEFENSE MECHANISMS 11 (2005).
6. Anonymous's Operation Payback was a series of actions against a range of organi-
zations alleged by Anonymous to have suppressed free speech. David Sarno, 'Hac-
tivists' Fight for Their Cause Online, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2010, at Ai.
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sial website that exposed classified U.S. diplomatic cables to the public.' In a
manifesto posted online around the time of the attacks, a spokesman for
Anonymous appealed to the democratic sensibilities inherent in the group's ac-
tions, asserting that "Anonymous does not seek to disturb the public peace nor
the average Internet citizen; for average Internet citizens are most of us who are
Anonymous."' The British government had a much different take on the at-
tacks: They were crimes (for which authorities soon arrested five citizens)9 and
a wake-up call for the government to reassess its own cybersecurity.o Indeed,
for activists interested in WikiLeaks's right to free expression, launching attacks
designed to silence their targets was an awkward tactical choice. While a num-
ber of activists in addition to Anonymous have argued that DOS attacks are just
an online form of political protest," these attacks can do a surprising amount of
damage. They exploit basic weaknesses in the architecture of the Internet to
produce consequences ranging from the suppression of protest by repressive
governments to the unavailability of public services and potentially large losses
to the economy."
In a recent editorial, The Economist addressed claims that Operation Pay-
back was comparable to civil disobedience or other forms of protest by articu-
lating the intuitive distinction between the two:
[I]n a free society the moral footing for peaceful lawbreaking must be
an individual's readiness to take the consequences, argue in court and
fight for a change in the law....
Protesters in cyberspace, by contrast, are usually anonymous and
untraceable. The furtive, nameless nature of [DOS] attacks... [makes]
anonymous perpetrators look like cowardly hooligans, not heroes.
Unfortunately, while American federal and state governments have cybercrime
statutes on the books that are broad enough to cover DOS attacks, the text of
these statutes often includes no reference to the unique type of harm created
when legitimate users cannot access online content. The law largely continues
7. Id.; Mark Clayton, Did WikiLeaks Bring on Cyberwar? Maybe a Cyber Sit-In,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/
1223/Did-WikiLeaks-bring-on-cyberwar-Maybe-a-cyber-sit-in.
8. Dwyer, supra note 1.
9. Josh Halliday, Police Arrest Five over Anonymous WikiLeaks Attacks, GUARDIAN
(London), Jan. 27, 201, at 15.
10. Milmo & Morris, supra note 1.
n1. See, e.g., infra note 140 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Section I.B.
13. Editorial, The Rights and Wrongs of Hacktivism, EcoNoMIsT, Dec. 18, 2oo, at 16.
For another popular commentary arguing that the nonhierarchical nature of so-
cial media dilutes their potency as direct causes of change, see Malcolm Gladwell,
Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted, NEW YORKER, Oct. 4,
2010, at 42, available at http://archives.newyorker.com/?i=2olo-10-o4#folio=o42.
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to rely on vague, outmoded language to criminalize new types of harmful
actions as technology evolves.1 4 In the meantime, Anonymous is promoting a
new paradigm for protest and democratic community that implicitly calls into
question the desirability of statutes with such broad reach. The inattention that
courts" and academic literature"6 have shown to DOS attacks-and how their
perpetrators assign meaning to them-constitutes a missed opportunity to
refine how the law comprehends the elements of effective civic engagement as
more human interaction takes place online.
This Note analyzes the significance of DoS attacks in four parts. Part I
explains what DOS attacks are and the types of harm that they are capable of
producing: economic losses, the disabling of critical infrastructure, and the
suppression of others' speech.
Part II provides an overview of the current treatment that American law
gives to DOS attacks, beginning with a summary of the most common state law
approaches to addressing cybercrime in Section A and moving to a discussion
of the primary federal cybercrime statute in Section B.
Part III considers the case that has been made by various hacker-activists in
support of the prosocial character of DOS attacks. Section A addresses potential
First Amendment protections for DOS attacks and concludes that, while these
attacks may involve no more than the sending of excessive information to
targets, courts would not likely protect them as a form of speech due to the
harm that they cause. Section B evaluates the claim that DOS attacks are funda-
mentally like civil disobedience. It summarizes the similarities that support this
claim, reviews the American tradition of civil disobedience, and concludes that
DOS attacks lack the elements of legitimacy, grounded in physical space, that are
crucial to the role that civil disobedience plays in a healthy democracy.
Part IV discusses the ways in which the DOS phenomenon should inform
legal thinking about cyberspace. This Part moves from a particular discussion of
DOS attacks to show more generally that overreliance on traditional legal con-
cepts to govern cyberspace puts at risk values such as the consistent application
of criminal law and deliberative democracy. Section A emphasizes that the
priority of the legal community should be to clarify the essential values that law
protects in physical space instead of simply relying on convenient metaphors to
expand precedents to cyberspace. Section B demonstrates that moral and legal
confusion in classifying DoS attacks arises from a dangerous tendency to pre-
sume that pervasive self-expression, uprooted from a legacy of civic engagement
14. See infra Part II.
15. There have been very few cases involving DoS attacks in a criminal context. Only
in the last few years has the U.S. Department of Justice even begun to indict the
perpetrators of major DoS attacks. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Att'y's Office for
the Cent. Dist. of Cal., Two European Men Charged with Conspiring To Launch
Cyberattacks Against Websites of Two U.S. Companies (Oct. 2, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/walkerIndict.pdf; infra note 44.
16. See infra note 40.
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grounded in physical space, is the most important component of the "speech"
at the heart of our political tradition.
I. AN UNASSUMING THREAT
Anonymous was not the only group using DOS attacks to make a statement
about WikiLeaks in late 2010. On November 28, 2010, WikiLeaks was itself the
target of a DoS attack. The terse "tweet"" in which WikiLeaks made this revela-
tion reads like the climax of a presidential wartime speech: "We are currently
under a mass distributed denial of service attack."" Even so, WikiLeaks's
announcement lacked a certain gravity. Words like "attack" make the process
sound somewhat intimidating, but even distributed denial-of-service attacks,19
which are potentially much larger and more effective than the type of attacks
that LOIC made possible, do not directly put individuals or computer systems
in physical danger. The average news reader is not likely to be alarmed, especial-
ly if she learns how widespread these attacks already are: In a leading study on
the volume of these attacks, researchers determined that as many as 68,700
attacks had taken place worldwide in the preceding three-year period.2 0 The
idea of hackers quietly flooding servers with more requests than the servers can
handle does not quite measure up intuitively to the kind of threats that a world
familiar with terrorism can imagine. Especially when the victim is WikiLeaks,
an organization that leaked secret cables that an individual allegedly took ille-
gally from a U.S. government computer,"' DOS attacks may just appear to be the
chosen means by which hackers war with each other and not worth a great deal
of attention from law enforcement or analysts.
Contrast this recent episode with events in the spring of 2007, when hackers
infected up to a million computers worldwide and instructed them to launch a
three-week DOS offensive against media, banking, and government networks in
Estonia." The source of the attack was unclear, but analysts believe that in addi-
17. "Tweets" are small bursts of information that users of the website Twitter.com
can share with one another over a real-time network. About, TWITTER,
http://www.twitter.com/about (last visited Nov. 24, 2011).
18. WikiLeaks, Tweet by WikiLeaks, TWITTER (Nov. 28, 2010), http://www.twitter
.cOm/#!/Wikileaks/status/892o530488926208/.
19. See infra text accompanying note 29.
20. David Moore et al., Inferring Internet Denial-of-Service Activity, 24 ACM TRANS-
ACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS 115, u6 (20o6), available at http://www.caida
.org/publications/papers/2oo6/backscatter dos/backscatterdos.pdf.
21. Noam Cohen, Ex-Hacker Who Accused Suspect of Army Leak Is Still Talking, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2010, at B3 .
22. Adrian Blomfield, Estonia Calls for NATO Cyber-Terrorism Strategy, DAILY TELE-
GRAPH (London), May 18, 2007, at 18; Mark Landler & John Markoff, After
Computer Siege in Estonia, War Fears Turn to Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2007, at Al.
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tion to knowledgeable hackers who likely planned and executed the attack,
thousands of ordinary Russians may have participated in the offensive after
reading instructions that were posted on dozens of Russian websites seeking to
capitalize on nationalist fervor against Estonia." The attack did not cripple the
government's websites or online capabilities for the full three weeks, but the
attack was effective in diverting a substantial amount of the government's atten-
tion and resources. 4 Small nuisances that by themselves would amount to
inconveniences in today's electronic world-a Member of Parliament without
access to email for four days or a traveling Estonian businessman without access
to his bank accounts-aggregated to become enough of a breach in national
security for Estonia to present the issue formally to NATO. 5
A. How Denial of Service Works
Compared to other categories of crime that involve more physical activity,
cybercrime is fairly discreet. Although perpetrators can do a lot of damage, they
can do so quietly and from the comfort of their own homes. Pure DoS attacks
exemplify the seemingly benign actus reus of cybercrime. A perpetrator need
not "break and enter" into any computer systems to gain control of them in
order to carry out the attack. The simplest form of a DOS attack is information
overload: A single person with sufficient computing resources sends enough
"packets"" of information to a target server for those packets to deplete the
server's resources, preventing it from responding to requests from other users. 7
Some varieties of the basic attack rely on modified packets that can tax a server
more effectively by tricking the server into tying up scarce resources.
23. Blomfield, supra note 22, at 18.
24. Robert Vamosi, Cyberattack in Estonia-What It Really Means, CNET NEWS (May
29, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/2o8-7349-3-6186751.html (quoting Jose Nazario,
Senior Researcher, Arbor Networks).
25. Blomfield, supra note 22, at 18; Landler & Markoff, supra note 22, at Al.
26. Data travels over the Internet in small, discrete chunks called "packets." Comput-
ers send each other these packets as part of a system of communication called
TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) that serves as the
foundation of the Internet. MIRKOVIC ET AL., supra note 5, at 296, 298.
27. Id. at 16.
28. Id. at 16-17. One example is a "SYN flood" attack, which exploits communication
protocols to deceive the target server. Computers exchanging data using TCP/IP
must first open a connection with each other through a process known as a
"three-way handshake." The first computer sends a specific type of packet called a
"SYN packet" to request a connection, to which the second computer will
respond with an acknowledgment. Finally, the first computer establishes the con-
nection with a second packet of its own. In a SYN flood attack, the packet that the
attacking computer first sends to request a connection has fake, or "spoofed,"
source IP address information. The target server therefore sends its acknowledg-
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Distributed denial of service, or DDoS, is a type of DOS attack that involves
conduct more traditionally understood as "hacking." Preparation for a DDoS
attack begins when an individual user gains some degree of control over a
number of other computers, usually through the spread of a specially coded
computer virus that the user distributes over the Internet to infect vulnerable
systems. 9 Computer experts colorfully refer to this process as the "recruitment"
of "zombies" for use in an attack.30 Then, the user is able to instruct the infected
systems to engage in a DoS attack against the target server. These attacks can
take on a much larger scale than simple DOS attacks because of the rapidity and
ease with which the attack's manager can enlarge the network of computers that
he controls, called a "botnet," by spreading malicious code over the Internet.3'
As with a physical war, the outcome of an attack depends in large part on
the level of resources available to the target. Target servers with larger band-
width and more data ports for opening connections with other computers will
fare better on average, since a successful attack must deplete one of those
resources." When attackers seize additional resources in order to scale up their
attacks, targets can respond by implementing algorithms that evaluate incom-
ing packets and filter out illegitimate traffic. The diversity of systems within
"zombie" networks makes filtering very difficult, however, since attack manag-
ers can make the flood of requests appear to originate from a wide variety of le-
gitimate sources." A savvy attacker can thus manipulate the content of packets
to make it much more difficult to trace the packets back to him and to deter-
mine his identity.34
ment to a false return address, and the third part of the "handshake" never hap-
pens. As a result, the comparatively few resources that a server dedicates to open-
ing connections are tied up managing "half-open" connections that the attacker
never intended to complete. Id. at 80-81.
29. Id. at 17.
30. See Paul Robichaux, Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks and You, MICROSOFT
TECHNET, http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc722931.aspx (last visited
Nov. 25, 2011).
31. See MIRKOVIC ET AL., supra note 5, at 24-27. Microsoft claims to have cleaned up
over 9.5 million host computers between August 2003 and April 2004 that had
been compromised by this sort of activity. Id. at 26.
32. See U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, Denial of Service Attacks, CERT
COORDINATION CENTER (June 4, 2001), http://www.cert.org/tech-tips/denial
of service.html.
33. Tao Peng, Christopher Leckie & Kotagiri Ramamohanarao, Survey of
Network-Based Defense Mechanisms Countering the DoS and DDoS Problems, 39
ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 1, 1-2 (2007), available at http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/
-tpeng/pi-peng.pdf.
34. The structure of the Internet-which resembles a near-endless switchboard of
possible pathways on which information can travel-makes this problem difficult
to overcome. Id. at 7-8. Network service providers are theoretically capable of
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B. One Person's Nuisance, Another's Crisis
The U.S. government has developed more capacity to deal with cyber-
threats since the 2007 attacks on Estonia," but American targets are by no
means immune. In fact, DOS attacks on American targets are fairly common.
An annual survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute found that in
each of the last six years, between seventeen percent and thirty-two percent of
the organizations surveyed were the target of a DOS attack.36 The attacks can be
costly: The survey found that the combined cost of DOS attacks for a group of
269 respondents amounted to about $26 million in 2004 alone.37 The true cost,
however, may be higher after factoring in losses in consumer confidence: After a
series of DoS attacks in 2000 on major companies that included Yahoo, eBay,
E*Trade, CNN, and Amazon.com, over forty percent of respondents to a PC
Data Online poll said that they were less likely to shop online.3' Further, the
tracking the route that a packet of information takes to a destination server, but
the large costs and privacy concerns associated with doing so can make retracing
that route impracticable. Id. at 8; see also id. at 15, 31 (listing proposals for technical
self-help solutions to attacks that employ spoofing, with cautious optimism only
for proposals that address spoofing close to the packets' source).
35. Recent efforts by the United States to promote cybersecurity have included both
foreign assistance and domestic policy changes. In May 2011, the United States
sent four Secret Service agents to investigate cybercrimes in the Baltic region and
to serve as support staff to the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in
warding off cybercrime. United States Secret Service, EMBASSY U.S.: TALLINN, EsT.,
http://estonia.usembassy.gov/usss.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2011); U.S. Secret Ser-
vice Opens Cybercrime Office in Estonia, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/o5/2o/us-secret-service-cybercrime-estonia
n-864946.html. To protect American interests, the Pentagon released a new cy-
berstrategy in the last year that provides for the use of conventional force in re-
sponse to some cyberattacks, and accompanying this strategy is a new, classified
list of cyberweapons the United States keeps at its disposal. Ellen Nakashima, De-
fense Dept. Develops List of Cyber- Weapons, WASH. PosT, June 1, 2011, at A3.
36. ROBERT RICHARDSON, 2010/2011 CSI COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY SURVEY 17
(2011), available at http://gatton.uky.edu/FACULTY/PAYNE/ACC324/CSISurvey2olo
.pdf. Survey respondents were executives or computer security practitioners in
U.S. corporations, government agencies, financial institutions, medical institu-
tions, and universities. See id. at 4-5.
37. LAWRENCE A. GORDON ET AL., 2004 CSI/FBI COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY
SURVEY 1, 10 (2004), available at http://i.cmpnet.com/gocsi/db-area/pdfs/fbi/
FBI200 4 .pdf. See CSI COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY SURVEY ARCHIVE,
http://gocsi.com/SurveyArchive (last visited Nov. 25, 2011), for reports from 2004
through 2009 in which respondents report less profound losses.
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costs may be so small to any one business that the trouble is just not worth
reporting. 9
Outside of the news coverage that DOS attacks receive as a result of events
like the attacks on Estonia or WikiLeaks, the public remains largely uncon-
cerned with the unique character of the attacks or how they differ from other
cybercrimes. 40 The worry for analysts who discuss the dangers of DoS attacks is
not the economic cost faced by individual businesses-though those costs are
potentially serious in some cases-but rather the threat that ongoing attacks
pose to general access to public services or important information.4 ' The archi-
tects of the Internet made fundamental design choices in favor of connectivity
and resource-sharing that provide cause for this worry.42 Servers, the physical
39. See ROBERT RICHARDSON, 20o8 CSI COMPUTER CRIME & SECURITY SURVEY 4, 23
(2008), available at http://i.cmpnet.com/v2.gocsi.com/pdf/CSIsurvey2oo8.pdf.
40. Scholarly literature in particular has very little to say about the special significance
of DOS attacks. When academic commentators mention denial of service, it is
usually as one of a number of forms of cybercrime. The discussion tends to turn
primarily toward practical questions about law enforcement and costs as opposed
to the attacks' unique relationship to free speech and associated democratic
norms. See, e.g., Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical
Approach to the Application of Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 177 (2000); Charlotte Decker, Note, Cyber Crime
2.o: An Argument To Update the United States Criminal Code To Reflect the Chang-
ing Nature of Cyber Crime, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 959 (2008); Note, Immunizing the
Internet, or: How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love the Worm, 119 HARv. L.
REV. 2442 (2006).
41. Prior to Estonia, a few isolated but noteworthy events prompted some members
of Congress to conclude that some critical online infrastructure was vulnerable
enough to DOS attacks to merit more attention. See Cyber Attack: Roadblocks to
Investigation and Information Sharing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Ter-
rorism, & Gov't Info. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, io6th Cong. 7 (2000) [here-
inafter Cyberattack Hearing] (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Dir., Fed. Bureau of
Investigation). For example, in 2000, a DoS attack successfully took down an FBI
website for several hours. Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein). In 1996, a
teenage prankster making telephone calls in a manner analogous to a DoS attack
periodically clogged up 911 telephone lines in eleven Florida counties over the
course of a few weeks. Id. at 7 (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Dir., Fed. Bureau of
Investigation); see also Swedish Teen Fined for Prank Florida Calls, TAMPA TRIB.,
May 2, 1997, at 2. This event made it clear that unsophisticated actors with limited
resources were capable of nontrivial interference with networked emergency ser-
vices. As "traditional operations in essential services, such as banking, transporta-
tion, power, health, and defense, are being progressively replaced by cheaper,
more efficient Internet-based applications," this type of threat becomes more
serious. Peng, Leckie & Ramamohanarao, supra note 33, at 2.
42. One fundamental difference between the Internet and telephone networks, for
example, is that "circuit-switched" telephone lines allocate channels for each con-
nection that are wholly separate from one another throughout the connection.
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machines that store content on the Internet, can host multiple unaffiliated
websites in an arrangement called "shared hosting." 43 Thus, even though an
attacker's intent is usually to target one particular website, a DOS attack against
a server that hosts multiple websites could cause a significant amount of "colla-
teral damage" as users are blocked from accessing websites that themselves were
not targeted. 44
Other special servers called Domain Name System (DNS) root servers are
responsible for directing traffic any time an Internet user types in a website's
textual web address instead of its numerical IP address.4 5 A worst-case scenario
in the context of DOS might be what attackers attempted to bring about in a
2002 DDoS attack on all thirteen of the Internet's DNS servers: the disabling of
large chunks or all of the Internet's IP address directory system.46 While the
attack was unsuccessful due to the system's resilience, over half of the thirteen
servers were seriously affected. 47 Had the attack successfully disabled all of the
servers for a period of forty-eight hours-a hypothetical worth considering
even if it is highly unlikely-it is possible that Internet users would have been
unable to access websites for which they did not know the IP address.48 The epi-
sode made it clear that serious, large-scale DDoS attacks pose a unique threat to
DNS root servers and are a primary concern in efforts to secure those servers.4 9
Nonetheless, a survey of attempts at large-scale DOS attacks suggests that
the primary significance of such attacks is not their potential to bring about
"Packet-switching," by contrast, makes use of shared pathways that can be
clogged. Peng, Leckie & Ramamohanarao, supra note 33, at 7-8.
43. The reason why an organization would engage in basic shared hosting or an
evolved form called "cloud computing" is to avoid the costs of maintaining server
hardware in-house. A recent crash in Amazon.com's cloud computing services
took down the websites of some major customers, demonstrating the vulnerability
of websites hosted on shared servers. See Joseph Galante, Amazon Web
Services Disruption Knocks Customer Sites Offline, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 21,
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2oni-o4-21/amazon-com-says-some-web
-services-for-businesses-not-available.html.
44. For example, one man received a sentence of thirty months' jail time for aiming
DDoS attacks at his business competitors, causing hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars in damage. See Press Release, U.S. Att'y's Office for the Dist. of N.J., Michigan
Man Gets 30 Months for Conspiracy To Order Destructive Computer Attacks on
Business Competitors (Aug. 25, 20o6), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cyber
crime/araboSent.htm.
45. Daniel Karrenberg, DNS Root Name Server FAQ, INTERNET Soc'y, http://www
.isoc.org/briefings/o2o (last updated Feb. 2008).
46. See MIRKOVIC ET AL., supra note 5, at 5-6.





MAKING CYBERSPACE SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY
doomsday: Experts concede that the vast majority of attacks are small nuisances
and that hypothetical catastrophes are unlikely.50 The highest value of analyzing
DOS attacks may be in understanding how and why perpetrators carry them out
in cyberspace, where technology continues to pose new questions about the line
between self-expression and injury to others. Estonia's experience suggests the
presence of a wide array of motives and strategies behind DoS attacks with
broad participation. For attackers with particularly disruptive motives and vul-
nerable targets, however, DoS looks less like protest and more like sabotage.
The Kremlin may not have been involved in the attacks on Estonia, but Russian
involvement was harder to deny when Georgia's computer systems succumbed
to a DOS attack while Russia simultaneously initiated a military operation in
South Ossetia in 20o8Y
Beyond implications for diplomacy between states, politically motivated at-
tempts at online incapacitation pose serious problems for independent media,
human rights groups, or other organizations doing advocacy work that rely on
their websites to disseminate information.5 The Russian-Georgian conflict pro-
vides a clear example. A 20o9 DDoS attack that shut down Twitter for several
hours contained a strange twist: The attackers ordered their botnet to send a
flood of emails linking to pages on Twitter and Facebook, which in turn linked
to the website of a pro-Abkhazia activist." The activist's website was unable to
handle the massive traffic and shut down for the duration of the attack.54 Other
threats to oppositional voices can be more direct. The Chinese government is
thought to rely on DDoS attacks as part of its arsenal against human rights
groups, as evidenced by untraceable yet powerful DDoS attacks in early 2010
that brought down a number of Chinese human rights websites for sixteen
50. See MIRKOVIC ET AL., supra note 5, at 28 ("Even some of the high-profile attacks
on major Internet sites were not that difficult to handle once the defenders were
aware of the nature of the attack and had a little time to respond to it.").
51. See Tom Espiner, Georgia Accuses Russia of Coordinated Cyberattack, CNET (Aug.
11, 2oo8), http://news.cnet.com/83o1-1009-3-1001415o-83.html.
52. The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University released a
report in 2010 summarizing its research into the prevalence of DDoS attacks
against independent media. See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 4. Researchers dis-
covered reports of 140 attacks against the websites of over 280 different indepen-
dent media and human rights organizations during the twelve-month period
from September 2009 to August 2010. Id. at 26.
53. Barbara Ortutay, Activist Hackers Attack Twitter, TIMES ARGUS (Barre-Montpelier,
Vt.), Aug. 7, 2009 (News), at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 26949151. Abkhazia is a se-
cessionist region in Georgia that Russia has recognized as independent. Based on
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hours." As recently as April 18, 2011, the servers hosting U.S. website Change.org
began experiencing occasional interruptions in service due to an attack origi-
nating in China after the website's petition for the release of Chinese prisoner
Ai Weiwei gained popularity.5' Even short attacks pose an appreciable threat if
the suppressed content is time sensitive. One example is the DDoS attack that
blocked access to opposition newspapers' websites in Kyrgyzstan during the
country's 2005 elections.57 The attacks were traceable back only to Ukrainian
"hackers-for-hire," thus leaving open the question of whether the Kyrgyz gov-
ernment covertly sponsored an act of repression."
II. CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DOS ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES
The policy argument that government should address the DOS threat re-
sponds to a collective action problem inherent in the Internet's nonhierarchical
structure. Internet service providers, which oversee the delivery of data from the
Internet to end users, do not want to spend resources policing activity over the
Internet if such prevention efforts allow other Internet service providers to "free
ride" without engaging in such costly efforts themselves. 9 The problem became
salient enough for the U.S. government to take notice in early 2000, however,
when DoS attacks took down the websites of several major corporations."o Pres-
ident Clinton responded by calling an "emergency summit" of government of-
ficials, Internet company executives, and security experts to address the threat."
55. See Owen Fletcher, Chinese Human Rights Sites Hit by DDoS Attack, COMPUTER-
WORLD (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9147938/Chinese
human-rights sites-hit byDDoS-attack.
56. The attacks even prompted a Congresswoman from Connecticut to send an
open letter to her colleagues in Congress that asked for the involvement of
Secretary of State Clinton in condemning the attacks. Benjamin Joffe-Walt,
Congresswoman Asks Colleagues To Pressure Sec. Clinton over Foreign
Cyber-Attack on Change.org, CHANGE.ORG BLOG (May n1, 2011), http://blog
.change.org/2o11/o5/congresswoman-asks-colleagues-to-pressure-sec-clinton
-over-foreign-cyber-attack-on-change-org/.
57. Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of
Control, in AcCESs DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET
FILTERING 41 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008), available at http://www.opennet
.net/sites/opennet.nef/files/Deibert03_Cho2 029-o56.pdf.
58. See id.
59. Karrenberg, supra note 45 ("[N]o ISP wants to bear the associated cost first while
others profit and do not incur the cost. There is clearly an area for government
action here."); see also Peng, Leckie & Ramamohanarao, supra note 33, at 37.
6o. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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The FBI promptly began a criminal investigation into the attacks,62 but it was
Canada that eventually prosecuted the youth who went by the pseudonym
"Mafiaboy" and was responsible for perpetrating the attacks.' After pleading
guilty to fifty-five charges of criminal mischief,64 he received a sentence of only
eight months in a youth detention center."* Notwithstanding the large-scale
response his actions triggered, one expert warned that Mafiaboy's amateur
behavior was only the "tip" of the hacker "iceberg" and that thousands of other
hackers were learning from his mistakes."
The pervasiveness and potential disruptiveness of DoS attacks give the
United States a stake in managing the threat, whether or not the perpetrators of
attacks or their targets fall within its jurisdiction. Rather than pursuing a purely
regulatory path for each cyberthreat, the federal government and all fifty states
have adopted legislation criminalizing actions that threaten the integrity of
computers and networks generally." The rationale behind the use of criminal
law for this purpose is pragmatic and straightforward: Given the evolving
opportunities for individuals to use technology to threaten others' privacy, safe-
ty, and material assets, it is appropriate to update criminal laws that already
exist to protect against such threats in the physical world. 8
This Part analyzes the current treatment of DOS attacks under American
criminal law. Federal and state statutes succeed in proscribing DOS attacks by
62. Id.
63. Dan Verton, Teen Hacker 'Mafiaboy' Pleads Guilty to 55 Charges, COMPUTER-
WORLD (Jan. 18, 2001), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/56555/Teen
hackerMafiaboypleads-guiltyto55_charges.
64. Id.
65. 'Mafiaboy' Sentenced to 8 Months, WIRED (Sept. 13, 2001), http://www.wired.com/
techbiz/media/news/2o01/o9/46791.
66. Verton, supra note 63.
67. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 1-3 (Scott Eltringham
ed., 2d ed. 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
ccmanual/ccmanual.pdf; Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access"
and "Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1615
(2003).
68. S. REP. No. 99-432, at 1 (1986) (explaining that it is important for federal legisla-
tion to evolve in response to "a new type of criminal-one who uses computers to
steal, to defraud, and to abuse the property of others"), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2480; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 2on) ("It is the
intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to expand the degree of protec-
tion afforded to individuals, businesses, and governmental agencies from tamper-
ing, interference, damage, and unauthorized access to lawfully created computer
data and computer systems."). See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in
Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2001) (endorsing an economic theory of cost
deterrence as a reason to refocus cybercrime prevention efforts on analyzing the
choices of an individual cybercriminal).
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relying on a definition of "damage" or "access" that covers the particular effects
that an attack has on a server. As a result, perpetrators of attacks would indeed
be criminally liable under practically every jurisdiction's generic cybercrime
statutes. However, no generic statute provides convincing legal principles that
distinguish DoS attacks from lawful use of the Internet because liability under
those statutes turns on an inherently ambiguous inquiry into whether use was
"authorized." This Part concludes that the only apparent way for criminal sta-
tutes to avoid this ambiguity is to identify intent to bring about denial of service
as an element of the crime. Such a narrowly drawn statute more effectively
communicates the law's condemnation of DOS attacks by isolating the decision
to attack as a unique source of harm.
Depending on the attacker's motives and relationship to the target, DOS
attacks could fall under a number of categories of criminal conduct involving
fraud or extortion and other threats.'9 This Part does not aim to describe all the
possible avenues to criminal liability that DOS attacks could create. Rather, it
seeks to identify the essentially criminal nature of DOS attacks and the ways in
which federal and state statutes could be applied consistently to proscribe
attacks without reaching legitimate Internet use.
A. State Cybercrime Statutes: Defining "Access"
States took an early lead in the criminalization of computer misuse.7 o At
first, courts mostly relied upon the common law crime of theft to classify and
punish any harm done through computers.' Due to the difficulty of demarcat-
ing property in computer usage, courts were forced to infer a violation of prop-
erty rights from the presence of a substantial harm even if no principled expla-
nation of how the defendant violated those rights was available.7 ' The parallels
69. A few such federal statutes include prohibitions on extortion that affects com-
merce, threats transmitted in interstate commerce, receipt of proceeds of extor-
tion, and fraud in connection with access devices. MIRKOVIC ET AL., supra note 5,
at 244-45.
70. Almost half of the states had adopted legislation specific to computer crimes by
1983. Dodd S. Griffith, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured
Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453, 459 (i9o). The federal gov-
ernment was actually somewhat reluctant to pass its first cybercrime legislation in
the mid-198os, given concerns about redundancy and overstepping federal
authority. Id. at 458-59.
71. Kerr, supra note 67, at 1607-09.
72. Id. at 161o-n1 ("[T]he [courts'] reasoning seemed to go something like this: When
a person is harmed, the person loses something of value; when a person loses
something of value, they are deprived of property. Therefore the infliction of
harm triggers a theft.").
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between hacking and crimes such as trespass or burglary are hard to ignore,3
but traditional property crime laws proved to be insufficient to deal with
instances of misuse that commentators agreed were criminal even when they
did not cause consequential harms.7 4 Accordingly, every state responded to this
deficiency by developing a criminal statute specific to computer crimes.7 1
In describing the actus reus of computer crime, states primarily rely on the
concept of "access," which most states define by statute." Courts' historical
concern with the protection of economic interests in property is reflected in an
expansive, clear definition of "access" that favors the owner of the computer(s)
being accessed. A very common formulation of this definition is to "instruct,
communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of
any resources of a computer, computer system, or computer network."7
This definition readily enables the criminalization of DOS attacks. Such an
all-encompassing definition essentially makes any interaction with a computer
network an instance of access and would indisputably categorize DoS attacks as
such. Of course, "access" cannot be the basis for liability by itself; otherwise, all
Internet use would be unlawful. To distinguish between lawful and unlawful
usage, most states establish offenses in terms of access "without authoriza-
tion."7' Authorization would presumably serve the same function as permission
or consent in the definition of criminal trespass to real property, under which
the property owner's wishes ultimately determine whether access is lawful.7 9
73. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as "Virtual Crime"?, 4 CAL.
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 55 81-82, 84 (2001) ("Conceptually, it makes no difference wheth-
er the area that is unlawfully accessed exists in the physical world or in the virtual
world; the harm to the owner of that area is logically indistinguishable.").
74. See Kerr, supra note 67, at 1615.
75. Id.
76. Those that do not define "access" do define an alternate word such as "use" to
cover essentially the same conduct. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-101 (2011);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-92 (2011).
77. FLA. STAT. § 815.03 (2011). No fewer than thirty states include a close derivative of
this language in their definition of access or use. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 156.00(7) (McKinney 2011) ("'Access' means to instruct, communicate with,
store data in, retrieve from, or otherwise make use of any resources of a computer,
physically, directly or by electronic means."). Illinois is an example of a state that
replaces "resources" with "services." See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/17-55 (West
2011). The statute goes on to provide that .'[s]ervices' includes but is not limited
to computer time, data manipulation, or storage functions." Id.
78. Susan W. Brenner, State Cybercrime Legislation in the United States of America: A
Survey, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 28, 1 15 (2001), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v7i3/
article2.html.
79. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 21.2 (2d ed. 2011) ("In
the typical criminal trespass case, however, the claim that the defendant's entry or
remaining was unlawful will come down to the contention that it was so because a
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Assuming that no one would authorize an attack on his own server, any DOS
attack would thus be criminal in one of the many jurisdictions wherein unau-
thorized access to a computer network is itself a criminal offense, regardless of
the amount of loss accruing to the target server's owner.so
Unfortunately, these statutes retain the fundamental ambiguity plaguing
the prosecution of computer crimes at common law: There does not appear to
be a principled way to distinguish DOS attacks from lawful conduct since "un-
authorized" remains ambiguous."1 States may attempt to delineate unlawful
access by proscribing conduct that causes "disruption" in networks," but this
strategy provides little help in elaborating the criminal nature of DoS attacks. A
person who accesses a busy ticket-sales website may well know that he is pre-
venting another user from loading the site during times of high traffic, but he is
hardly a criminal for wanting to be first in line.
Some states have been able to avoid an overbroad or imprecise prohibition
of DOS attacks by making the intent to effectuate denial of service an element of
person with a legal interest in the property or an agent of that person had exer-
cised a legal right to forbid such entry or remaining.").
80. For an example of the simplest, least serious form of liability that a state might
impose for this conduct, see HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-895.7 (2011) ("A person
commits the offense of unauthorized computer access in the third degree if the
person knowingly accesses a computer, computer system, or computer network
without authorization."). In granting summary judgment to a woman whose hus-
band broke into her protected online information, a federal district court in
Arkansas recently noted how little case law exists on an Arkansas computer tres-
pass statute-an observation that makes sense in light of how uncomplicated the
analysis in computer trespass cases often is. See Miller v. Meyers, 766 F. Supp. 2d
919, 924 (W.D. Ark. 2on) ("While there is little case law interpreting this particu-
lar statute, it is clear to the court that Defendant intentionally accessed the
MySpace and Yahoo computer networks without authorization and should now
be held liable for computer trespass.").
81. Any attempt to define authorization across the board runs into trouble quickly.
Tennessee defines authorization as "any and all forms of consent, including both
implicit and explicit consent," TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-601 (2011), but this defi-
nition turns on the meaning of "consent" and could well be void for vagueness as
applied in some cases. See infra text accompanying notes 107-109. A requirement
of express consent might seem promising in tackling the vagueness problem, see
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-101 (2011), but of course an Internet user cannot rea-
sonably expect to have affirmative permission from server owners to load every
website she visits. One suggestion for resolving the ambiguity limits the definition
of "unauthorized access" to the bypassing of code-based restrictions on system
use. See Kerr, supra note 67, at 16oo.
82. Alaska's statute proscribes unauthorized access that causes a disruption in com-
puter networks; however, the statute does not define "disruption." See ALASKA
STAT. § 11-46.740 (2010).
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the crime.3 The language employed by such prohibitions ranges from a basic
description of a perpetrator's design14 to the direct use of the term "denial of
service attack."" These provisions may still only cover those actions that are
"without authorization," 6 but the inquiry into whether a DOS attack was specif-
ically authorized is necessarily simpler than determining whether a server owner
has authorized any action qualifying as "access." Unlike most Internet use, DOS
attacks cause harm by design and are presumptively unwelcome to targets. An
organization would likely authorize a DOS attack on its servers only in order to
allow computer security practitioners to test the networks that they manage."
The phrase "without authorization" in some DoS-specific statutes therefore
functions mostly as a limitation on liability for a category of conduct that is
only rarely sanctioned in the first place. Consequently, all statutes specific to
DOS attacks locate the essential criminal nature of the attacks-the character
83. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 7-302 (West 2010) (requiring intent to in-
terrupt the operation of computers or networks); 18 PA. CONs. STAT. § 7612 (2011)
(prohibiting intentionally or knowingly engaging in a scheme that has denial of
service as its design). Knowingly taking part in a purposive, organized attack
effectively amounts to an intent to attack, cf United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215,
223 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that defendant's knowing use of a computer program
designed to achieve unlawful ends was substantively the same as intending those
unlawful ends), but knowingly denying service to others could be entirely devoid
of any intent to deny service, see infra text accompanying note 112.
84. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:73.4 (2010) ("An offense against computer users is the
intentional denial to an authorized user, without consent, of the full and effective
use of or access to a computer, a computer system, a computer network, or com-
puter services.").
85. 18 PA. CONs. STAT. § 7612. Some states even have a spyware statute that isolates
the distribution of malicious code used in DDoS attacks as an offense separate
from simply interfering with others' access through standard DoS attacks. See,
e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-H:2 (2011) ("A person... who is not an autho-
rized user, shall not knowingly cause a computer program or spyware to be
copied onto the computer of a consumer and use the program or spyware to ...
[t]ake control, through intentionally deceptive means, of the consumer's comput-
er by... [u]sing the consumer's computer as part of an activity performed by a
group of computers for the purpose of causing damage to another computer,
including launching a denial of service attack.").
86. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-456 (2on) ("Any person who willfully and without
authorization denies or causes the denial of computer, computer program, com-
puter system, or computer network services to an authorized user ... is guilty of a
Class 1 misdemeanor.").
87. The LOIC used by Anonymous was originally a tool designed for testing purposes,
after all. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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that separates them consistently from lawful conduct-in the choice to engage
in a specific type of harmful conduct, not in a failure to obtain authorization."
B. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Defining "Damage"
The federal government's primary legal response to computer crimes is
codified in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) at 18 U.S.C. § 1030,
which has been amended several times since its enactment in 1986 to adapt to
newly realized threats.89 Its prohibitions cover practically any instance of cyber-
crime nationally because of the statute's expansive definition of "protected
computers": The term includes, in addition to certain computers used by finan-
cial institutions and the federal government, any computer "used in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer
located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate
or foreign commerce or communication of the United States."90
The Act's primary provisions include prohibitions against extracting
information from computers,91 accessing exclusive government computers or
especially sensitive information,92 engaging in threats to perpetrate cybercrime
as a means of extortion,93 committing fraud,94 and generally taking actions that
cause damage to computers.95 The primary mechanism used by the statute to
cover the range of technical means by which computer users could pursue these
illegitimate goals is to make "access [ing] a computer without authorization" or
"exceed[ing] authorized access" the first element of an offense.9' Offenses
defined according to this mechanism usually require some additional action or
interference on behalf of the offender;97 consequently, these provisions do not
apply to the simplest DOS attacks, which only require an attacker to access the
resources that a server uses to communicate with other computers.
88. The State may never punish an "unlawful intent" absent some sort of action on
that intent, but it is fully consistent to suggest that the intent element of a given
crime supplies a criminal nature to the accompanying action that it otherwise
would not have attained. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 79, § 6.1.
89. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 67, at 2-3.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (Supp. 2010); see Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1577-78 (2010).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(2) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
92. Id. § 1030(a)(1), (3) (2006).
93. Id. § 1030(a)(7) (20o6 & Supp. 2010).
94. Id. § 1030(a)(4), (6) (2oo6).
95. Id. § lo3o(a)(5)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
96. Id. § 1030(a)(1) (20o6); see Kerr, supra note go, at 1561-62.
97. See sources cited supra notes 91-94.
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The provision most relevant to DOS attacks, § 1030(a)(5), defines offenses
with a greater emphasis on damage than access. The first subparagraph of this
provision, § 1030(a)(5)(A), does not even mention access at all: It holds liable
anyone who "knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information,
code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage
without authorization, to a protected computer."9' Of course, DOS attacks are
not damaging in a conventional sense because they do not physically harm tar-
get servers.99 Nevertheless, the Act defines "damage" as "any impairment to the
integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information." 0 Based
on this definition, it is clear that liability under the CFAA should attach to any
perpetrator of a DOS attack who intends the effects that an attack has on a serv-
er and has not been authorized to carry out the attack by the server's owner."'o
DDoS attacks would create liability on multiple counts: In addition to decreas-
ing the availability of data on target servers, these attacks rely on unauthorized
access to and impair the integrity of every "zombie" computer commandeered
without authorization to attack those servers.0 2
It is not a cause for celebration that the statute relies on definitions that are
broad enough to criminalize DOS attacks:0 3 The language may be too vague to
98. 18 U.S.C. § lo3o(a)(5)(A) (Supp. 2010).
99. See supra text accompanying note 27.
oo. 18 U.S.C. § 1o3o(e)(8) (2oo6).
1o. In the penalties subsection, the statute provides that felony liability under
§ 1030(a)(5)(A), with a maximum of ten years' imprisonment, attaches only if the
harm caused falls into one of several categories: loss aggregating to $5000 in a
year; interference with medical examination, diagnosis, or treatment; physical
injury to anyone; a threat to public safety; damage to federal government systems
used in furtherance of national security or justice; or damage affecting ten or
more protected computers in a year. Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i), (B)(i) (2oo6 & Supp.
2010). The bar for felony liability is thus not very high. Since any number of pro-
tected computers might use the resources of a server under attack, there seems to
be no reason why this last type of harm would not automatically trigger felony
liability for most DoS attacks. Also, $5000 is not a very high threshold: When cal-
culating its "loss," a target can include consequential damages or expenditures
related to assessing damage in addition to estimates of lost revenues. Id.
§ 1030(e)(u) (20o6). In any event, a DoS attack would always be at least a misde-
meanor punishable by a fine and up to one year in prison. See id.
§ 1o3o(c)(4)(G)(i) (2oo6 & Supp. 2010).
102. See Sinrod & Reilly, supra note 40, at 199-202. Given the expansive definition of
"damage," unauthorized access to zombie systems would create liability under
subparagraphs (B) and (C) as well. See § 1o3o(a)(5)(B)-(C) (20o6 & Supp. 2010).
103. The Department of Justice's Prosecuting Computer Crimes manual claims that the
provision addressing damage to others' data was conceived in part to protect
against DoS attacks. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 67, at 2.
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survive a constitutional due process analysis in some cases.o 4 Although provi-
sions involving "access" are not relevant to the prosecution of DOS attacks, it is
worth noting that the CFAA does not ever define "access" despite using the
word in the text of most of the statute's offenses. More problematic is that the
CFAA, like state statutes, fails to define "authorized" and thus leaves open the
question of exactly which types of conduct constitute "unauthorized access."105
The unfortunate consequence is that prosecutors and courts are free to adopt
an interpretation of the statute that proscribes more activity than Congress
might have intended.' In one prominent case, the government sought convic-
tion of someone who created a fake profile on MySpace, arguing that merely
violating a "Terms-of-Service" agreement on a website rendered the defendant's
access "unauthorized" under the CFAA.1o7 Given that the maximum penalty for
this single violation would have been five years' imprisonment,"o' the district
court's decision to grant the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on
void- for-vagueness grounds seems eminently reasonable.o 9
104. The Supreme Court has made it clear that as-applied constitutional challenges to
criminal statutes under the Due Process Clause may succeed where the lack of
clarity as to exactly what conduct is unlawful violates "the requirement that a leg-
islature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." City of Chicago
v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358
(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This principle holds true "even if an
enactment does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected con-
duct" because it may still "fail[] to establish standards for the police and public
that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests."
Id. at 52.
105. Kerr, supra note 90, at 1573-78 (drawing on void-for-vagueness case law to suggest
that a legitimate constitutional question is raised if the meaning of the words "un-
authorized access" controls the scope of the statute). For an overview of theories
explicating "unauthorized access" in the context of the CFAA, see Cyrus Y.
Chung, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: How Computer Science Can
Help with the Problem of Overbreadth, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233 (2010).
106. Civil liberties groups recently sent a letter to ranking members of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee expressing their concern about the potential for prosecutorial
abuse under the CFAA due to the vague meaning of "authorized." Letter from
Laura W. Murphy, Dir., Wash. Legislative Office, Am. Civil Liberties Union et al.,
to Sen. Patrick Leahy & Sen. Charles Grassley (Aug. 3, 2011), available at
http://cdt.org/files/pdfs/CFAASign-on_1tr.pdf.
107. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
1o8. The defendant in this case was charged with violating § 1030(a)(2)(C), id. at 452,
punishable by up to five years' imprisonment, § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii).
109. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 467 ("It is unclear that every intentional breach of a website's
terms of service would be or should be held to be equivalent to an intent to access
the site without authorization or in excess of authorization. This is especially the
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The phrase "damage without authorization" threatens similar problems
with vagueness. While one could assume that DDoS and simpler DoS attacks
would be unauthorized under the statute, there is no consistent principle for
distinguishing between harmful, presumptively unauthorized damage and the
incidental kind of damage that must be authorized for the Internet to function.
The enumerated types of damage that trigger felony liability under
§ 1030(a)(5)(A) are mostly obvious harms that would presumably be unautho-
rized, but misdemeanor liability could be predicated on more benign types of
unauthorized damage." After all, every attempt to access a website is at least a
knowing impairment of the overall availability of the server hosting the site-
and thus meets the statutory definition of "damage"-yet no one would suggest
that an individual's personal use is unauthorized.
The mens rea provision of § 1030(a)(5)(A) does not resolve the ambiguity
inherent in the word "authorization," but the provision does narrow the scope
of the offense. The statute prevents plainly lawful Internet use from falling with-
in the scope of the prohibition by requiring that an offender intentionally and
not just knowingly engage in conduct that causes unauthorized damage."' DOS
attacks have damage as their design, whereas an ordinary Internet user's pur-
pose is to access information legitimately even as he is aware that he is consum-
ing server resources."' Congress even expressly took this distinction into
account in drafting one of the amendments to the CFAA."3 And although the
language still allows for the possibility that intentional damage would be autho-
rized, it is hard to imagine that prosecutors would find this ambiguity to be an
obstacle in taking on high-profile attacks that cause sizable harm."4
no. See supra note loi and accompanying text.
in. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (Supp. 2010).
112. For this reason, the prohibition by some states on "knowingly" or "recklessly"
denying service to other users is overbroad and inappropriate. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 502 (West 2010) ("[A]ny person who commits any of the following acts is
guilty of a public offense:... Knowingly and without permission us[ing] or
caus[ing] to be used computer services."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 934 (2011)
(using the word "intentionally" but also attaching liability for recklessly interrupt-
ing service).
113. See S. REP. No. 99-432, at 5 (1986) ("[T he Committee is concerned that the 'kno-
wingly' standard in the existing statute might be inappropriate for cases involving
computer technology."), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2483-84; see also
United States v. Phillips, 477 F-3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining the signific-
ance of the amended "intentionally" standard in the context of the damage provi-
sions in § 1030(a)(5)).
114. Losses that reach the $5000 mark trigger a higher level of penalties. See supra note
l1 and accompanying text. Although proving damages of at least that amount
may have been straightforward in one prosecution for a DDoS attack against eBay
under the CFAA, see Decker, supra note 40, at 985-86, measuring damages from
DOS attacks is inherently difficult, see Sinrod & Reilly, supra note 40, at 227.
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III. A TACTIC IN SEARCH OF A JUSTIFICATION
No matter how clearly a statute may mandate the attachment of criminal
liability to conduct, criminal liability is not a final judgment on the moral legi-
timacy of the conduct. To the extent that criminal law casts a normative shadow
over prohibited conduct, it does so because of the assumption that the State
would punish an individual only for a good reason-namely, that the conduct
in question is sufficiently antisocial.' Nonetheless, our criminal laws may fail to
map out with perfect accuracy our collective judgments as to which behaviors
are impermissibly antisocial, especially since there is not always agreement
about which conduct should fall into that category. A legal prohibition against
murder is an easy point of agreement, and likewise most people would agree
that it is wise to keep the law out of conflicts over immoral conduct that would
be difficult or inappropriate for authorities to punish, such as breaking a gra-
tuitous promise that induces no reliance"' or carelessly hurting someone's feel-
ings.117 Disputes about the appropriateness of criminal liability may surface in
marginal cases, however, where an offender violates a sensible legal rule but
lacks moral blameworthiness."' It is at these junctures that would-be offenders
115. As used in this Note, the word "antisocial" is intended to carry a moral connota-
tion consistent with ordinary criminal punishment theory. See Kyron Huigens,
The Jurisprudence of Punishment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1793, 1802-06 (2007).
While moral disapproval alone is not sufficient to criminalize conduct, Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) ("[T]he fact that a State's governing majority has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice.. . ."), the presence of a satisfying moral
rationale for criminalizing conduct appears to be almost necessary in the Ameri-
can system of criminal law, see, e.g., John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason
of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021
(1999) (finding that, despite upholding the constitutionality of some strict-liability
crimes, the U.S. Supreme Court has tended to honor the longstanding ideal of
requiring moral blameworthiness in federal criminal convictions).
n6. See, e.g., Mount Sinai Hosp. of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Jordan, 290 So. 2d 484,
486-87 (Fla. 1974).
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965) ("There is no occasion
for the law to intervene in every case where some one's feelings are hurt."). The
qualifier "carelessly" matters, of course, given the presence of a mens rea require-
ment in the definition of emotional harm torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 (1965). To the extent that mens rea matters in making emotional harm
actionable, it is evident that considerations of justice are indeed sensitive to the
"badness" of someone's intent regardless of the minimal nature of the harm.
n8. One commentator writing about small public order offenses notes that lack of
moral blameworthiness, rather than a simple lack of legal clarity, may explain why
a case falls near the "borderline" of criminal law. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Nor-
mative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not To Prosecute, no COLUM. L. REV.
1655, 1666-67 (2010). He recognizes that "First Amendment and vagueness ques-
tions tend to raise the toughest legal issues in the context of petty street-sweeping
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and their allies have an opportunity to contest the presumption that the crimi-
nal law as it stands is an accurate codification of society's ideal restrictions on
conduct.'19
A number of activists have tried to carve out space at the borderline of
criminal activity for the legitimate use of DOS attacks as a form of political
protest. They argue that the technology, even if disruptive, is a means to the le-
gitimate end of expressing disagreement with the policies of governments or
large corporations.'2 0 One label that has emerged to describe the concept of
cybercrimes-as-protest is "hacktivism,"' a word that captures the tension be-
tween the criminal and democratic elements of such tactics. Indeed, even the
first usage of the word "hacker" in modern tech parlance in 1963122 reflected the
conflict between the dangerous consequences of interfering with networks and
the creativity inherent in such actions.1 3 Creativity does not make criminal
conduct any less prohibited, of course, and it is safe to say that some form of
expression more nuanced than mere creativity is necessary to begin questioning
whether expressive conduct should be immune from criminal sanction.
Proponents of DoS attacks have made a number of arguments to frame the
tactic as a legitimate form of expression, ranging from appeals to principles of
free speech' 4 to the assertion of an extrajudicial authority to punish certain
statutes. But in the main, the proposition is somewhat uncontroversial: Greater
agreement exists about the wrongfulness of conduct that violates core criminal
statutes." Id. at 1667.
119. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
453, 475-76 (1997) ("The criminal law's influence as a moral authority has effect
primarily at the borderline of criminal activity, where there may be some ambigu-
ity as to whether the conduct really is wrong.").
120. See infra text accompanying notes 140-148.
121. Cyberattack Hearing, supra note 41, at 26-27 (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Dir., Fed.
Bureau of Investigation).
122. See Posting of Fred R. Shapiro, fred.shapiro@yale.edu, to Am. Dialect Soc'y Mail-
ing List, ADS-L@listserv.uga.edu (June 13, 2003), http://listserv.linguistlist.org/
cgi-bin/wa?A2=indo 3o6B&L=ADS-L&P=R5831.
123. See Henry Lichstein, Services Curtailed: Telephone Hackers Active, TECH (Cam-
bridge, Mass.), Nov. 20, 1963, at 5c, available at http://duartes.org/gustavo/
blog/post/first-recorded-usage-of-hacker. A professor at MIT was quoted in the
school newspaper saying that he "appreciate[d the] curiosity" of the boys respon-
sible for shutting down certain telephone networks but warned that repeated
involvement would expose them to criminal liability and disciplinary action by
the school. Id.
124. See infra Section III.A. The Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT) justified its
DoS attack against the Mexican government in 1998 as "a symbolic gesture in
support of Mexico's Zapatistas." Stefan Wray, Electronic Civil Disobedience and the
World Wide Web of Hacktivism: A Mapping of Extraparliamentarian Direct Action
Net Politics, 4 SWITCH, no. 2, 1998, http://switch.sjsu.edu/web/v4n2/stefan; see also
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organizations for operating against principles of freedom and openness of in-
formation on the Internet."' At the latter extreme, attackers may even be willing
to acknowledge that the attacks themselves are "wrong" but nevertheless claim
that they are excusable as part of an appropriately measured response to the
target group's reprehensible conduct."' This radical claim clearly does not pro-
vide shelter from the criminal law, but such a claim does point to the resolve of
hacktivists who defiantly choose to break the law. This Part addresses the varie-
ty of arguments made by proponents of the use of DoS attacks to justify the at-
tacks on legal and moral grounds and concludes that DOS attacks merit neither
protection under the First Amendment nor a comparison to civil disobedience.
A. Doctrinal Obstacles to First Amendment Protection
As hacktivism grows in popularity, the likelihood increases that those
engaging in less technically invasive attacks such as simple DOS might seek con-
stitutional protection from prosecution. One public defender in California has
already stated his intention to make such an argument in one of the first up-
coming CFAA prosecutions for political DOS attacks. Commenting on his
homeless client's alleged DOS attack against the City of Santa Cruz for its
anti-camping law, the lawyer claimed that "[t]here's no such thing as a DDoS
'attack'. . . . A DDoS is a protest .... It's not a crime, it's speech.""' Attackers
would be highly unlikely to succeed in a First Amendment challenge to laws
prohibiting DoS, however, because of the limited circumstances in which the
Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the First
Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 159 (2001) ("The
argument of the EDT has been that the sending of queries is merely a repeated
exercise of free speech rights.").
125. Open Letter from Anonymous to Sony, http://anonnews.org/?p=press&a
=item&i=787 (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). In this letter, Anonymous responds to
Sony's lawsuit against hackers who provided information about "jailbreaking"
PlayStation 3 consoles. The letter states that Sony has committed an "unforgivable
offense against free speech and Internet freedom" and asserts that Anonymous is
engaging in "disciplinary" actions against a web domain that Sony is only "rent-
ing." Id. In general, a spectrum of possible justifications from legal to anarchic
aligns closely with John Rawls's map of different types of dissent. See JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 363 (1971) ("[Forms of opposition to democratic
authority] range from legal demonstrations and infractions of law designed to
raise test cases before the courts to militant action and organized resistance. A
theory specifies the place of civil disobedience in this spectrum of possibilities.").
126. See, e.g., Open Letter from Anonymous to Sony, supra note 125 ("Now Anonym-
ous is attacking your private property because we disagree with your actions. And
that seems, dare we say it, 'wrong.' Sound familiar?").
127. Ryan J. Reilly, 'Homeless Hacker' Lawyer: DDoS Isn't an Attack, It's a Digital Sit In,
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case law recognizes expressive conduct as protected speech. Two main Supreme
Court cases define the extent to which the First Amendment protects expressive
conduct: Spence v. Washington"' and United States v. O'Brien.'9
In Spence, the Court established that expressive conduct attains the status of
symbolic speech if that conduct carries with it an intent to convey a particula-
rized message that the audience is likely to understand.o30 This latter require-
ment sets a high bar for DOS attacks-it is implausible to suggest that the mean-
ing behind a DOS attack would be apparent to users for whom a website simply
fails to load.'3' Even so, the first DoS attack on WikiLeaks in November 2olo is
an example of an attack that might satisfy this test. Although the attack was
anonymous, opposition to the release of classified State Department cables was
motivated by one concern-protecting U.S. troops and assets-that could be
presumed to be the rationale of the attacker.'3 It is a stretch to conclude that his
intention was to make a symbolic statement about the importance of national
security rather than to prevent the release of documents, but at least his cause
was clear.
No matter how clear an attacker's message may be, though, a DOS attack
would fail under the test that the Court established just a few years prior to
Spence. In O'Brien, the Court ruled that the government may regulate expres-
sive conduct by drafting laws within its constitutional power that serve an
important interest and are not aimed at suppressing speech."' The core logic of
the O'Brien holding is found in the Court's declaration that it could not "accept
128. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
129. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
130. 418 U.S. at 410-11.
131. See Nicholas Bramble, Ill Telecommunications: How Internet Infrastructure Provid-
ers Lose First Amendment Protection, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 67, 89
(2010), available at http://www.mttlr.org/volseventeen/bramble.pdf.
132. One hacker in particular, calling himself "Jester," posted on Twitter to claim
responsibility for the attack. He explained that he attacked WikiLeaks "for at-
tempting to endanger the lives of our troops and other assets." Angela
Moscaritolo, Political Hacker Takes Credit for Wikileaks DDoS Attack, SC MAGA-
ZINE (NOV. 29, 2010), http://www.scmagazineus.com/political-hacker-takes-credit
-for-wikileaks-ddos-attack/article/191669. Whether "Jester" was responsible for
the attack or not, it seems safe to attribute his rationale to whoever was responsi-
ble since public opposition was very unified in its concern for U.S. assets. A
nationwide McClatchy-Marist poll found that seventy percent of adults who had
heard about WikiLeaks believed that WikiLeaks was "doing more harm than good
by allowing enemies of the U.S. to see confidential and secret information about
foreign policy." Marist Poll, WikiLeaks: Prosecution Warranted ... Does More
Harm than Good, Say Americans, MARIST INST. PUB. OPINION (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://maristpoll.marist.edu/12i3-wikileaks-prosecution-warranted-%e2%80%a6
-does-more-harm-than-good-say-americans/.
133. 391 U.S. at 376-77.
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the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech'
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea."'3 4 Even though a political argument such as the one implicated in the
November 2010 attacks on WikiLeaks is of a nature that the First Amendment
fundamentally encourages, DOS attacks themselves are not as inherently expres-
sive as they are disruptive (of others' ability to speak, no less). The pure transfer
of information is not necessarily pure speech-and thus not necessarily deserv-
ing of constitutional protection-if the effect of that transfer is to impose harms
that the State has an interest in preventing.' While an individual may certainly
expect a type of heightened review to be applied to restrictions on speech,'
expressive conduct must first qualify as speech to receive such protection.
In sum, it seems clear that a governmental interest in preventing harmful
interference with the flow of webpage information from a server host to a user
would foreclose any First Amendment claim. This interest arises directly from
the spirit of the First Amendment itself: In the words of one blogger, "You don't
stand up for free speech by using a muzzle."' 7 Courts may not use the First
Amendment to restrict the behavior of nonstate attackers acting in a private
capacity,' " but they can certainly refuse to call DOS attacks "speech" in the
interest of a healthy public sphere and economic well-being.
134. Id. at 376.
135. In a 2000 case concerning the posting of computer code that would illegally
decrypt digitally encrypted videos on proprietary DVDs, one district court reaf-
firmed that while mere expressiveness may implicate the First Amendment, it
does not necessarily command the First Amendment's protection. Suggesting that
the extent of harm caused by the computer code is of vital concern, the court
noted that simply concluding that the First Amendment is relevant "still leaves for
determination the level of scrutiny to be applied in determining the constitution-
ality of regulation of computer code." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,
inl F. Supp. 2d 294, 304,327 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
136. See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009) (recognizing that
content-based restrictions on speech are "'presumptively invalid' and subject to
strict scrutiny" (quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 188
(2007))); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 213-14 (1997) (outlining the
components of "intermediate scrutiny" for content-neutral regulations of
speech).
137. Tom Watson, Denial of Service, Denial of Speech, Tom WATSON (Dec. 12, 2010),
http://tomwatson.typepad.com/tomwatson/2010/12/denial-of-service-denial-of
-speech.html.
138. The text only speaks of Congress, see U.S. CONsT. amend. I, and the Fourteenth
Amendment's incorporation of the First Amendment's restraints applies only to
state actors. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000).
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B. A Flawed Comparison to Civil Disobedience
Another argument in support of the legitimacy of DOS attacks as a form of
public protest does not hinge upon the attacks' constitutional merit. Those who
consider themselves stakeholders in the use of DOS attacks may make a purely
moral argument in support of the tactic and push for public support in pursuit
of the tactic's longer-term acceptance as legal or useful.13 9 These advocates face
quite a challenge: Despite statutes and First Amendment case law that would
deny to DoS attacks legal status as protected speech, these people nonetheless
seek to articulate the inherent value that DoS attacks have as a form of protest
in bringing about desirable change. To be successful, this vision must persua-
sively distinguish between that which is criminal and that which is immoral, in
effect recruiting the public at large to be stakeholders themselves in the effort to
frame DOS attacks as prosocial.
Ever since its first DoS attack against the Mexican government in 1998, a
group calling itself the Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT) has taken the lead
in touting the prosocial character of DOS attacks.140 Expressing its disagreement
with the treatment of Zapatista rebels in Mexico, the group encouraged the use
of a primitive DOS program called FloodNet against the websites of the Mexican
president, the Mexican Secretariat of Governance, and even the U.S. White
House as acts of so-called "electronic civil disobedience."141 Instead of using the
malicious, invasive code that is characteristic of DDoS attacks, FloodNet was
the first deployment of a type of attack called Client-Side Distributed Deni-
al-of-Service (CDoS).142 This program invited mass participation in a DoS
attack but on a voluntary basis, by downloading a program that would enable an
139. These stakeholders can include perpetrators themselves or even mere onlookers
who express support for the tactic. A good example of someone with this latter
profile is a commenter on Amazon's website whose username was the name of a
computer hacker heroine from a famous book series and who wrote in support of
the Operation Payback attacks. Jane Warren, Bizarre World of the Hacktivists,
DAILY ExPRESS (U.K.), Dec. 10, 2010, http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/
216593/Bizarre-world-of-the-hacktivists ("Whilst I will not personally engage in
any cyber activities against you, I will lend my wholehearted support to those who
do and I will watch on with amusement and gratification as you slowly sink."
(quoting the commenter) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
140. See Stefan Wray, The Electronic Disturbance Theater and Electronic Civil Disobe-
dience, THING.NET (June 17, 1998), http://www.thing.net/-rdom/ecd/EDTECD
.html.
141. Id.
142. Charles Nelson & Anita Ramasastry, Cybercrime, BERKMAN CTR. INTERNET &
Soc'y (June 22, 2002), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/studygroup/cybercrime
.html.
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individual to direct his computer to send messages in coordination with the rest
of the attack. 43
This characteristic of CDoS attacks is significant because it provides a
popular legitimacy to larger-scale attacks that DDoS attacks-which involve
taking unauthorized control of computers-could never have. A group of
Internet activists calling themselves the "electrohippies collective" celebrated
this distinction in 2001 after their own CDoS action against the World Trade
Organization, noting:
[DDoS] actions . .. are created by abusing the routers of web servers to
generate huge numbers of incomplete requests. [A DDoS action is]
[e]ffective, but the manner of the action, and its covert nature, mean
that it does not have any particular democratic legitimacy.
So, the difference between the two actions is one of popular legiti-
macy versus individual will. The structure of the client-side distributed
actions developed by the electrohippies means that there must be wide-
spread support across a country, or continent in order to make the
system work. Our method has built within it the guarantee of democratic
accountability. If people don't vote with their modems (rather than voting
with their feet) the action would be an abject failure.144
The attractiveness of CDoS as a means of protest may not be limited to individ-
uals who agree with the particular goals of the electrohippies collective or other
activist groups. The creativity and impact of these groups' methods have the
potential to inspire any institutional thinkers who are looking for fresh
approaches to activism.145 The EDT even claims to have had an audience with
Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet and Society in 1998 to explain its
approach to online activism.14'6 The most convincing proof of the attractiveness
of CDoS is its employment by Anonymous in some of the group's recent
high-profile activities.147 The extent of Anonymous's connections to the EDT or
143. Kreimer, supra note 124, at 158.
144. DJNZ & the Action Tool Dev. Grp. of the Electrohippies Collective, Client-Side
Distributed Denial-of-Service: Valid Campaign Tactic or Terrorist Act?, 34
LEONARDO 269, 270 (2001).
145. Writing in 20o6, a professor of sociology specializing in globalization studies at
Columbia University extolled the virtues of Internet activism such as the EDT
employs as part of her overall discussion of new avenues for women's activism.
Saskia Sassen, Local Actors in Global Politics, Isis INT'L (Oct. 2, 2006),
http://www.isiswomen.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=3o1&l
temid=191 ("There is the vastly expanded repertory of actions that can be taken
when electronic activism is also an option.").
146. Posting of Ricardo Dominguez, rdom@thing.net, to post@nettime.free.XS2.net
(Oct. 13, 1998, 2:32 AM), http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-1
-9810/msgooo79.html.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
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the electrohippies collective is unclear, but the appeal to the individual partici-
pant is the same. After visiting an Anonymous chat room, one computer pro-
grammer became inspired to join the attack on PayPal because of similarities he
saw to "the college sit-ins of the '70s" and Mahatma Gandhi's civil disobedience
movement against British rule. 14
1. A Tempting Comparison
The rhetoric of civil disobedience is useful for DOS attackers because it pro-
vides a framework within which to describe DOS as an inherently legitimate
activity regardless of whether the law recognizes it as permissible. Civil disobe-
dience, as a category of conduct, is defined by the conflict between a conduct's
illegality on the one hand and its supposed moral legitimacy on the other. 149
Ronald Dworkin argued in 1985 that "civil disobedience has a legitimate if in-
formal place in the political culture of [the American] community. Few Ameri-
cans now either deplore or regret the civil rights and antiwar movements of the
1960s.... They concede that these acts did engage the collective moral sense of
the community."'o This moral legitimacy, which may exist independently of a
protest's legal status, is ideal for proponents of DOS attacks in search of a con-
vincing, nonlegal basis to oppose the operation of the criminal law as is.
Admittedly, the metaphor of civil disobedience is enticing for more than this
reason alone. One of the founders of the EDT, Stefan Wray, wrote a manifesto
identifying his group's activities as part of a long tradition of civil disobedience
beginning with Henry David Thoreau and continuing through the Civil Rights
Movement and the Vietnam War, claiming:
As hackers become politicized and as activists become computerized,
we are going to see an increase in the number of cyber-activists who
engage in what will become more widely known as Electronic Civil
Disobedience. The same principals [sic) of traditional civil disobe-
dience, like trespass and blockage, will still be applied, but more and
more these acts will take place in electronic or digital form."'
Wray is not wrong to say that cybercrime has components that are analogous to
the mechanics of sit-ins historically conducted as civil disobedience. Insofar as
148. Somini Sengupta, For Suspected Hackers, a Sense of Social Protest, N.Y. TIMEs, July
26, 2011, at Bi.
149. The literature on civil disobedience provides a number of definitions, see infra text
accompanying notes 171, 176, but the tension between illegality and moral legiti-
macy is inherent to any formulation of the concept.
150. Bruce Ledewitz, Perspectives on the Law of the American Sit-In, 16 WHITTIER L.
REV. 499> 499 (1995) (quoting RONALD DwORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 105
(1985)).
151. Stefan Wray, On Electronic Civil Disobedience, THING.NET (Mar. 22, 1998),
http://www.thing.net/-rdom/ecd/oecd.html (paper presented to the 1998 Socialist
Scholars Conference).
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unauthorized access and denial of service are analogs for the trespass and block-
age that Wray mentions,"' this "electronic civil disobedience" invokes tech-
niques of protest used in periods of time that our political culture now recog-
nizes as revered moments of social change.
Regardless, the intuitively obvious contrast between physical sit-ins and
running programs from a computer terminal calls for pause in making such a
comparison. A look at how one of the Civil Rights Movement's iconic
grassroots efforts took place may elucidate the difference. On February I, 1960,
four black male students from North Carolina Agricultural and Technical Col-
lege took seats reserved for whites only at the lunch counter of a Woolworth's
department store in Greensboro, North Carolina.' Even though they had just
bought school supplies from another counter at the store, the waitress told the
students, "[W]e don't serve you here." The students replied, "We just beg to
disagree with you. We've in fact already been served."' 4 A dumbfounded wai-
tress and an angry police officer with no excuse to retaliate could only watch as
the students continued to occupy their seats peacefully.' 5 Support began to
grow for the student-led protest as soon as the local paper picked up the story.
Student reinforcements crowded the aisles awaiting their turn to occupy the
counter as others took part in nonviolent demonstrations outside.''' Over the
next few months, similar sit-ins began to take place in other North Carolina
cities and other segregationist states.' 7
Trespass, blockage, and an overall strategy of attrition were the tactics that
won the day in Greensboro. The black community's boycott of Greensboro
department stores, coupled with lost sales as customers avoided the ongoing
tension inside stores that the protestors occupied, eventually convinced store
owners to change their policies."' The ignition of a new spark in the whole Civil
Rights Movement,' 9 however, had far more to do with the symbolic content of
the protests. The president of CBS News at the time of the sit-ins recounted
many years later that "for the first time, segregation came out of the closet. The
152. See Brenner, supra note 73, 5 81, 84.
153. Owen Edwards, Courage in Greensboro, SMITHSONIAN, Feb. 2010, at 28, 28.
154. HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL Is RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH
REMEMBERED (1977) (quoting Franklin McCain), as reprinted in THE EYES ON THE
PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER 114, 115 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 1991) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
155. Id.
156. Edwards, supra note 153, at 28-29.
157. See id.; Rebekah J. Kowal, Staging the Greensboro Sit-Ins, DRAMA REV., Winter
2004, at 135, 136.
158. Kowal, supra note 157, at 136.
159. See Diedre B. Flowers, The Launching of the Student Sit-In Movement: The Role of
Black Women at Bennett College, J. AFR. AM. HIsT. 55 (2005).
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conscience of the whole nation was touched."'6s Brave students who studied
Gandhi's techniques and sent internal memoranda swearing off violence simply
occupied space, prepared to be arrested.'"' Ultimately, it was the arrest of for-
ty-five of them that motivated the black community to boycott Greensboro's
department stores and to push the city toward change.
After the EDT launched its FloodNet attack against government and finan-
cial targets in Mexico, Frankfurt, and the United States, a member of the group
explained the logic behind the group's attacks: "FloodNet is a symbolic ges-
ture. ... Let's kick up the dust, that's what hacktivists are trying to do. And if we
can kick up enough dust then we'll be able to get the media to look at us.""'
Some legal commentators and professionals have no problem using the term
"civil disobedience" to describe the actions of groups like the EDT. One of the
first articles to offer an overview of different types of cybercrime uses rhetoric
like "perpetrators" and "crimes,"'4 but it also describes the EDT's activities
against the Mexican government as "civil disobedience" in its primary text-
not as a quotation from any attacker's description of the same.6 5 One student
commentator claims that the only difference between the civil rights protests of
the 196os and DOS attacks around the turn of the twenty-first century is the dif-
ference in setting: cyberspace instead of physical space.'66 The lawyer
representing the man indicted for attacking the City of Santa Cruz recently
agreed: "It is no different from occupying the Woolworth's lunch counter in the
civil rights era." 67 While the word "hacktivism" at least signals to an audience
that society must still sort out a measure of moral tension inherent in online ac-
16o. Kowal, supra note 157, at 149.
161. RAINEs, supra note 154, at n6; Kowal, supra note 157, at 138, 147.
162. Kowal, supra note 157, at 136.
163. Warren, supra note 139.
164. Sinrod & Reilly, supra note 40, at 203.
165. Id. at 184; see also Giselle Fahimian, How the IP Guerrillas Won: @TM ark, Adbusters,
Negativland, and the "Bullying Back" of Creative Freedom and Social Commentary,
2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 22 ("One popular form of electronic civil disobe-
dience is accomplished through deinial-of-service ('DoS') attacks, also referred to
as virtual or electronic sit-ins.").
166. Andrew P. Lycans, Book Note, Cyberdemons: Regulating a Truly World-Wide Web,
101 MICH. L. REV. 1925, 1934 (2003) (reviewing STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR
CONTROL?: CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF
CYBERSPACE (2001)). Much less egregious but still unsettling is the conclusion of a
professor at NYU that groups like Anonymous provide "discrete micro-protest
possibilities that aren't otherwise present," as if to suggest that its hacker members
do not have other means of being "part of something greater." Gabriella Coleman,
Anonymous: From the Lulz to Collective Action, OWNI.EU (May 10, 2011), http://
www.owni.eu/2011/05/1o/anonymous-from-the-lulz-to-collective-action.
167. Reilly, supra note 127.
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tivity deemed illegal, using the phrase "civil disobedience" or going as far as
invoking the Greensboro sit-ins seems to submit that the self-described activists
are somehow already in the right and just waiting for their critics to catch up."'
2. The Moral Legacy of American Civil Disobedience
The difference in word choice is no small matter. A strong current in politi-
cal philosophy views civil disobedience not just as having a place in democracy
but as a problem that strikes at the heart of a democracy's moral legitimacy."
The struggle among scholars over the definition of civil disobedience is itself a
testament to this fact.c'o To some, a simpler definition of the concept has its ad-
vantages. Framing civil disobedience as being composed only of two elements-
illegality and the moral nature of arguments justifying the act-is logically
coherent and, in one view, lacks any self-serving additions or qualifications that
a group might use to justify its actions but exclude others. 7'
For Henry David Thoreau, a simple definition like this one might vindicate
his calculation not to obey certain laws.172 In his famous essay on civil disobe-
dience, he elaborates on this concern with stories about his indignant refusal to
pay taxes, culminating in a bold assertion about the relationship between gov-
ernment and the individual: "There will never be a really free and enlightened
State, until the State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and indepen-
dent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats
him accordingly." 7 Of course, this principle does little to distinguish between
168. The reason for this presumption is that there is no real unified scholarly definition
of the concept, see infra text accompanying note 170, and thus attempts to con-
struct a modern concept of civil disobedience really seem to have value only to the
extent that they describe those historical instances of illegal protest that we choose
to revere now.
169. See RAWLS, supra note 125, at 363 ("[The question of when the duty to oppose
injustice trumps the duty to follow the law] involves the nature and limits of ma-
jority rule. For this reason the problem of civil disobedience is a crucial test case
for any theory of the moral basis of democracy."); see also ELLIOT M. ZASHIN,
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY 67-69 (1972) (showing how the problem of
civil disobedience raises the question of what constitutes the "consent" of the
governed, which both Hobbes and Locke see as connected to a "quasi-moral obli-
gation to obey the law in a political society").
170. There is no universally accepted definition of "civil disobedience" in the literature.
ROBERT T. HALL, THE MORALITY OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 13 (1971).
171. For an example of an argument for this minimalist definition, see id. at 14-17.
172. See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, THE VARIORUM: CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 45 (Walter
Harding ed., 1967) ("It costs me less in every sense to incur the penalty of disobe-
dience to the State than it would to obey. I should feel as if I were worth less in
that case.").
173. Id. at 55.
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rebellion and civil disobedience, 174 and Thoreau's readers are left to wonder if
his rhetoric would be helpful at all to anyone resisting an audit by the Internal
Revenue Service, much less working toward the desegregation of public
accommodations.
A more persuasive construction of civil disobedience arises not out of in-
dignant rants about taxes but from the writings of moral leaders who personally
struggled for and achieved justice in volatile times, when pressure to abandon
principled direct action came from many different directions.175 John Rawls uses
the following description of civil disobedience in his influential work A Theory
of Justice: "a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law
usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of
the government."' 7 In his famous letter from a Birmingham jail, Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., describes his philosophy of direct action in terms that support
the principles that Rawls outlines.
First, the public character of acts of civil disobedience serves to illustrate the
conviction behind the message that participants want to send.'7 Rawls writes
that civil disobedience out in the open becomes "a form of address, an expres-
sion of profound and conscientious political conviction, [which] takes place in
the public forum.""'1 Similarly, Dr. King describes the desire for public demon-
stration as a desire to "create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a com-
munity which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the
issue."179 Crucially, this tension is personal. It arises from the presentation of
protestors' physical bodies themselves "as a means of laying ttheir] case before
the conscience of the local and the national community."o
174. See HALL, supra note 170, at 21.
175. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., used the term "direct action" to refer to organized
physical activism that created constructive tension in a community without
resorting to violence. See Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr., to Alabama Cler-
gymen (Apr. 16, 1963) [hereinafter King Letter], available at http://www.africa
.upenn.edu/Articles Gen/LetterBirmingham.html ("I have tried to stand
between these two forces, saying that we need emulate neither the 'do nothingism'
of the complacent nor the hatred and despair of the black nationalist.").
176. RAWLS, supra note 125, at 364 (paraphrasing H.A. Bedau, On Civil Disobedience, 58
J. PHIL. 653, 661 (1961)).
177. In Hall's articulation of a minimalist definition, he wrongly asserts that a defini-
tion requiring acts to be public would deny "any possible moral justifiability" to
nonpublic criminal acts. See HALL, supra note 170, at 16. While it is true that such
acts would not be considered civil disobedience under the Rawlsian definition,
Rawls leaves open the possibility that they could be justified on other grounds.
178. RAWLS, supra note 125, at 366.
179. King Letter, supra note 175.
180. Id. Valorizing the willingness to accept punishment makes sense only in the con-
text of a democracy in which public deliberation is possible in the first place,
however. One scholar points out that those who sheltered Jews in Nazi Germany
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Second, the requirement of nonviolence in Rawls's definition is especially
important." This requirement is not based on moral qualms with harming oth-
ers but rather with protecting the overall persuasiveness of protest. Violence
quickly crowds out a deliberative resolution of conflict by both deemphasizing
the protestor's logic and foreclosing an audience's willingness to adhere to an
argument."a2 Nonviolent acceptance of punishment, in contrast, leaves space for
the argumentative strength of protest to operate and reaffirms that the protes-
tors identify as part of the same community as the opposition whom they seek
to persuade.81 Justice Fortas, commenting on his dissent to an opinion uphold-
ing an injunction against Dr. King's march in Birmingham, described Dr.
King's acceptance of criminal liability for ignoring the injunction, without
complaint, as "action in the great tradition of social protest in a democratic
society where all citizens, including protesters, are subject to the rule of law."8 4
Respect for the rule of law is the key element that an oversimplified defini-
tion of civil disobedience lacks. As Justice Fortas suggests, this respect is embo-
died in the restraint shown by those who physically occupy public space yet
project only the force of their arguments. The health of a democracy depends
fundamentally on the public's faith that structures of governance prevent the
need for extrajudicial violence in resolving conflict.'" Unfortunately, deciding
would certainly not have been required to publicize their actions for their disobe-
dience to have been considered morally justified. See Kent Greenawalt, A Contex-
tual Approach to Disobedience, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 70 (1970).
181. See RAWLS, supra note 125, at 366.
182. Id. ("[Civil disobedience] tries to avoid the use of violence, especially against
persons .. . because it is a final expression of one's case."). A leading theory of
audience adherence to argumentation in speech communication literature con-
firms this direct tradeoff- "The use of argumentation implies that one has re-
nounced resorting to force alone, that value is attached to gaining the adherence
of one's interlocutor by means of reasoned persuasion.... Recourse to argumen-
tation assumes the establishment of a community of minds...." CH. PERELMAN
& L. OLBRECHS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION
55 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1969)
(1958).
183. French philosopher E. Dupriel describes each logical justification used in an
argument as "a moderating act, a step toward greater communion of heart and
mind." PERELMAN & OLBRECHS-TYTECA, supra note 182, at 55.
184. ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 35 (1968). The opi-
nion upholding the injunction that Dr. King ignored was issued in Walker v.
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
185. Public faith that political institutions are able to accommodate social change is a
necessary condition for any regime's stability, democratic or otherwise. See
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 1-5 (1968).
In a consolidated democracy, civil society and political society earn the right to
mediate this popular sentiment by embedding opposition to the state in a spirit of
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whether the actions of the State or an individual dissenter are truer to the rule
of law is difficult. Such a decision is dependent upon speculation about what
will be good for democracy once some yet-unmoved obstacle has vanished,
revealing uncharted political space. Protestors' open willingness to accept the
penalty for violating the law invites onlookers to decide for themselves how best
to respect the rule of law moving forward: whether to accept the application of
criminal law as a final resolution of the protest or to join in a bold new vision
for the community.'
3. The True Nature of DOS Attacks
DOS attacks have no role to play in this sacred tradition of civil disobe-
dience. Hidden behind individual computer screens, even well-meaning dissi-
dents who voluntarily pit their computing resources against the most notorious
targets are at best participating in a shallow gesture. The relative or actual ano-
nymity that participants enjoy in large-scale DOS attacks"' depersonalizes their
message, requires much less commitment,' 8 and thus evidences much less con-
constitutionalism and respect for the rule of law. See JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STE-
PAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION 7-10 (1996).
186. See King Letter, supra note 175 (" [A]n individual who breaks a law that conscience
tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in
order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality
expressing the highest respect for law."). Since in its purest form this act requires
no legal justification to be morally proper-and in fact may have less moral force
if a protester attempts to justify the act on legal grounds-this Note will not
address civil disobedience as an affirmative defense to crimes or the distinction
between "direct" and "indirect" civil disobedience. For that discussion, see, for
example, William P. Quigley, The Necessity Defense in Civil Disobedience Cases:
Bring in the Jury, 38 NEw ENG. L. REV. 3 (2003).
187. See supra text accompanying note 34. It is noteworthy that federal law enforce-
ment officials were able to track several suspected participants in Anonymous's
2010 DoS attack on PayPal who either did not know how to mask their online
identities or deliberately chose not to do so. See Sengupta, supra note 148, at B. In
response to the arrests of these individuals, Anonymous boldly proclaimed in an
open letter to law enforcement, "Your threats to arrest us are meaningless to us as
you cannot arrest an idea." Id. Presumably, however, the pages of instructions
that Anonymous provided to new members on how to mask their online identi-
ties made this proclamation more confident. See id. In September 201n, Anonym-
ous announced that it was developing a new DDoS tool to replace LOIC and cited
the volume of arrests of members using LOIC as a reason for the switch. See
Damon Poeter, Anonymous To Retire Low Orbit Ion Cannon?, PC MAG. (Aug. 2,
2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/o,2817,2390341,oo.asp#fbid=ngA4eBICbTm.
188. See infra note 2n. The fact that a person can only be in one physical space at a
time implies that a choice to appear somewhere in protest represents a commit-
ment unshared by someone who can simultaneously and anonymously participate
in a number of DOS attacks from the comfort of home.
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viction than a public act of disobedience in which an individual must take
responsibility for her actions and face possible criminal punishment."9 Individ-
uals protesting from home may feel just as strongly as public protestors, but the
community receiving their message will generally have no way of measuring
that conviction other than reading scattered essays and comments online and
measuring server downtime or bandwidth used by traffic.
The damage that DOS attacks cause, while not rising to the level of physical
violence, necessarily threatens the economic and social liberties of others and
thus disqualifies such attacks from being considered civil disobedience. 9 o These
threats break down the deliberative process generated by civil disobedience, in
which protestors rely only on the strength of their arguments and identify as
part of the same community as their audience. First, the harm caused by a DoS
attack drowns out the logical persuasiveness of hacktivists' arguments. Victims
of the collateral damage associated with attacks would likely attest to the
absence of any meaningful purpose behind their losses.'9 ' Second, DOS attacks
negate the potential for a more robust political dialogue about the issues moti-
vating the hacktivists who perpetrate these attacks. By presuming the opposi-
tion's unwillingness to negotiate, the DOS attacker presents no communi-
ty-affirming option for resolving conflict that allows the target or the legal
apparatus to respond to the presence of the protestor by standing down.'9 It is
189. See Greenawalt, supra note 180, at 70 (arguing that willingness to accept punish-
ment ensures that protest is more convincing at three junctures: (1) Such willing-
ness satisfies those who are incidentally harmed by protest that the protestors face
worse harm; (2) it forces individual protestors to act only on strong convictions;
and (3) it suggests to the audience that the magnitude of the injustice under scru-
tiny is great).
190. See RAWLS, supra note 125, at 366 ("Indeed, any interference with the civil liberties
of others tends to obscure the civilly disobedient quality of one's act."). In
contrast, the sit-ins in Greensboro led to economic losses for businesses not as an
inevitable consequence of direct action but as a result of the intervening senti-
ments of community members of different races who responded to the tension of
the protest in different ways. See supra text accompanying note 158.
191. See supra text accompanying note 44.
192. The only true test for a protestor's respect for the rule of law is when his mode of
protest actually runs afoul of the law. Anonymous's involvement in the Fall 2011
"Occupy" protests demonstrates this point. At first, the group's focus was to ena-
ble a new movement of nonviolent physical protest in spaces that would accom-
modate it. The group conducted a successful social media campaign in September
2011 to focus national attention on the original Occupy Wall Street campaign in
New York City's Zuccotti Park. Saki Knafo, Occupy Wall Street and Anonymous:
Turning a Fledgling Movement into a Meme, HUFFINGTON PosT (Oct. 20, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2o1/10/2o/occupy-wall-street-anonymous
-connection_n_1021665.html. Months later, when the Mayor of Toronto called for
the city to evict "occupiers" who lacked a permit to remain in a public park, Ano-
nymous threatened to deny service to the city's website instead of drawing on its
social media prowess to organize a grassroots response. See Alyshah Hasham,
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no defense that, historically, higher-profile electronic "sit-ins" against the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank have only
slowed down servers at most and not seriously denied access.'93 The visibility of
these attacks depends on the level of disruption they cause, and to the extent
that the success of these attacks depends on their visibility, so too does their
success.
Once the mechanics and effects of DOS attacks are in full relief, the moral
status of such attacks is clear. In a paper that EDT founder Stefan Wray pre-
sented to the 1998 Socialist Scholars Conference, he quoted Thoreau's assertion
that the best kind of government "governs not at all" and implied that
Thoreau's tradition of civil disobedience is the one that became "woven into the
fabric of dissent in this country."9 4 Given the paltry respect that DOS attacks
demonstrate for established order, it is apparent that an advocate like Wray
must rely on a strategy of protest no more nuanced than Thoreau's in justifying
the means that his group employs to protest its opponents' policies. The "civil
disobedience" that Thoreau exercised when refusing to pay taxes as a war pro-
test presents an image that, if accepted as a legitimate form of political protest,
would appear to give a group with any disagreement with the powers-that-be a
justification for the stubborn, unlawful resistance of its choice. The reason is
that Thoreau's approach to citizenship, embodied in any coherent justification
for DOS attacks, is only concerned with the rule of law so long as democratic
institutions accommodate the citizen's private moral agenda.'
IV. THE LIMITS OF THE GENERATIVE INTERNET
The Internet is a social force not naturally concerned with the rule of law-
it is a "generative" construct that empowers individuals to create and manipu-
late information in a way that defies previously understood limits.' To the
'Anonymous' Threat Doesn't Faze Mayor Ford, TORONTO STAR (Nov. 13, 2011),
http://www.thestar.com/news/article/1o86197--hacker-group-anonymous-threatens
-cyber-attack-if-city-evicts-occupy-toronto?bn= ("You have said that by next
week the occupiers shall be removed. And we say by next week if you do not
change your mind, you shall be removed from the Internet.").
193. See Kreimer, supra note 124, at 159-60.
194. Wray, supra note 151.
195. Thoreau is crystal clear about this distinction: "It is not desirable to cultivate a
respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a
right to assume is to do at any time what I think right." THOREAU, supra note 172,
at 33.
196. See Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1981
(20o6) ("Generativity is a function of a technology's capacity for leverage across a
range of tasks, adaptability to a range of different tasks, ease of mastery, and acces-
sibility.").
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extent that this construct changes the shape of our social order,'97 the legal and
moral issues raised by DOS attacks inform a larger debate about the meaning of
cyberspace. Cyberspace is obviously not the same as physical place, but scholars
disagree over the relevant differences.'9' Courts are unable to predict all of the
ways in which the Internet could be used, and thus they lack the capacity to sort
out all of the possible differences between cyberspace and physical space prior
to applying the law in new ways. New technological phenomena like DOS
attacks help to reveal these differences by demonstrating the unique kinds of
actions that are possible in cyberspace.' 9
This Part proposes that the DOS phenomenon provides a useful standpoint
from which to understand the unique challenges that cyberspace poses for legal
practitioners. First, the fact that prosecutors must stretch statutory definitions
of cybercrime to their limits to prosecute DOS attacks suggests that legislatures
should be more focused on the specific harms that evolving technology could
bring rather than the ways in which new uses of technology fit into preexisting
categories of conduct. Second, existing justifications for DOS attacks attempt to
infuse cyberspace with some of the most sacred notions of community forma-
tion available in physical space, thereby raising the question of whether cyber-
space is an equally adequate staging ground for democratic community.
Together, these two issues suggest that analysis of the differences between phys-
ical space and cyberspace is most valuable when it clarifies the essential demo-
cratic values that are inherent in laws governing physical space before making
judgments about how actions in cyberspace protect or threaten those values.
A. Knowing What To Punish
Legislators cannot successfully outlaw computer crimes by attempting to
draw property lines where they cannot be drawn. As long as the definitions of
federal and state cybercrimes continue to rely primarily on the concept of
"authorization," prosecutors and courts will have too much discretion to iden-
tify offenses. Moreover, the prosecution of offenses under these statutes will not
send a convincing signal that the conduct involved is actually wrong. The crim-
inal law plays an important expressive role in defining acceptable conduct for
American society."o By making it clear that DOS attacks are not fundamentally
of the same nature as lawful computer use, an ideal statute prevents the offend-
197. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 30 (2oo6).
198. See Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007) (sur-
veying various theories of the interaction between cyberspace and the concept of
"place" and the complex web of functionalist, postmodern, and other perspectives
underlying those theories).
199. Cyberlaw appears to be mired in a perpetual state of "catching up." See supra text
accompanying note 89.
200. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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er from arguing that her use would be understood as prosocial but for the pre-
dictable refusal of authorization from her morally blameworthy target.
Those states that have proscribed actions accompanied by a specific intent
to deny Internet service are at the head of the curve because such prohibitions
do not force prosecutors and judges to rely primarily on a broadly defined actus
reus as the core element of the crime. New categories of criminal conduct on
the Internet have the potential to sprout up anywhere that technology can be
used in a novel way to do harm."' When new harms arise from the use of oth-
erwise benign tools, it stands to reason that a malicious intent will be the only
element of an electronic act that distinguishes it as unlawful.2 0 2 A specific intent
element cuts through the legal and moral ambiguity of offenses predicated sole-
ly upon a lack of authorization and gives prosecutors and courts the means to
punish the creation of harm without the discretion to overreach.2 0 3
While prohibitions of harm done on the Internet should be specific, adapt-
ing to new circumstances requires our notions of what may qualify as harm to
be broad. Although the CFAA's prohibition of actions that intentionally cause
damage is useful for prosecuting felonies that cause high-dollar losses, the
networked nature of the Internet means that even large tangible losses can be
distributed across a wide variety of targets who may each individually expe-
rience only very small losses.2 0 4 Congress should also be mindful of the serious
threats to intangible values-such as the promotion of free speech-that
cyberattacks may pose to targeted entities even if those entities cannot tally up
enough of a dollar loss to get the Department of Justice's attention.2 0 5
201. See supra text accompanying note 68; see also supra note 135.
202. The intent to undertake a harmful act may not be what makes the act harmful,
but the mens rea element may be necessary to distinguish logically between harm-
ful and harmless actions when no other concept is available to distinguish them.
203. To dispose of residual vagueness problems with the word "authorization" entirely,
a jurisdiction could implement a statute proscribing all actions accompanied by
an intent to deny service but allow express authorization by server owners to serve
as an affirmative defense. Pennsylvania's DoS-specific statute omits discussion of
"authorization," but it fails to provide an affirmative defense that could shield
computer security practitioners from criminal liability. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 7612 (2011). While express authorization is completely unworkable as an inter-
pretation of "authorization" in broader cybercrime statutes, see supra text accom-
panying note 81, it seems practical to require computer security practitioners to
secure express authorization before using DOS attacks to test networks.
204. See Katyal, supra note 68, at 1090-91.
205. It is conceivable that, given limited resources, the Department of Justice would
only seek to prosecute felony violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1o3o(a)(5)(A). Damage of
$5000 or more to a target is the basic trigger for felony liability. See supra note ioi.
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B. Making Cyberspace Safe for Democracy in a Physical World
The difference between physical place and cyberspace is also significant
when it comes to our intuitions about democratic traditions like political pro-
test. Jonathan Zittrain of the Berkman Center explains why:
In front of a building, you get to play your First Amendment card all
the way to the door before you are dragged away .... In cyberspace,
you don't have clear public byways intersecting private spaces, so there
is no place to camp out and play your First Amendment card. If you try
to deny service to someone else, by whatever means you use, you could
be in pretty big trouble.206
As Zittrain suggests, fast and loose comparisons between the Internet and the
physical world are at best a source of legal confusion. At worst, they are also
dangerous inasmuch as they threaten awareness of the true constituent
elements of community and democracy. Some courts have been cautious about
transplanting concepts directly from physical place to cyberspace, which is
encouraging.2o7 Many courts, though, have found cyberspace metaphors to be
expedient, seemingly principled grounds for decisions.20s A presumption of
caution in transplanting legal concepts from physical place to cyberspace does
not seem to have taken hold yet in the Supreme Court's protection of free
speech on the Internet.2 0 , Current First Amendment doctrine is itself well pre-
pared to deem unprotected even expressive actions that cause identifiable
harm,2"' but the normative view of the Internet as a space primarily serving free
expression threatens to obscure this principle.2 1 '
206. Patti Hartigan, They Call It Hacktivism, Bos. GLOBE, Jan. 24, 1999, at F5 (quoting
Jonathan Zittrain, Faculty Co-Dir., Harvard Univ. Berkman Ctr. for Internet &
Soc'y).
207. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 309 (Cal. 2003).
208. Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 527-29 (2003)
(observing that courts are often willing to apply "inviolability" rules from real
property to information online even though such protections have never histori-
cally existed).
209. Indeed, a prominent Supreme Court case striking down restrictions on free
speech over the Internet relies on the opposite presumption. See Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) ("The dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas
[the Internet] ... continues to be phenomenal. As a matter of constitutional
tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmen-
tal regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free
exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of
expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit
of censorship.").
210. See supra Section III.A.
211. Anonymity, for example, may encourage the free flow of information, especially
from more hesitant sources such as political dissidents under repressive regimes.
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Some concepts used to organize physical space are useful in cyberspace. For
example, it is true that a hacker intrudes into a clearly private space when he
gains unauthorized access to a system. This fact does not, however, provide a
line designating where private cyberspace ends and public cyberspace begins.m'
Not only is there no line, but there is no gray area or middle ground between
the two spaces that would be comparable to public accommodations in the
physical world, where sit-ins sought to bring attention to the public character of
certain spaces that are technically private.2 13 The eager online activist looking to
bring an argument to a public place where all can take notice need only post her
own content to her personal blog.
The absence of distinctly public space on the Internet makes it more diffi-
cult for people to use cyberspace as an alternative site for forming strong com-
munities. Carol Rose's The Comedy of the Commons'4 demonstrates how even
nonpolitical recreational activity in physical spaces is particularly important for
the formation of a democratic community-political protest in those spaces
would presumably have similar value toward that end."' Zittrain's description
of the Internet as "generative" might provide some guidance as to how Internet
users could form community identity: acting in the aggregate to express prefe-
See Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges
to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1642 (1995). Demanding
unfettered anonymity in the interest of free expression, however, ignores serious
threats to civility and accountability for the verifiability of information. See id. at
1645.
212. Ignoring the difficulties that Kerr's definition of "authorization" poses for statutes
seeking to criminalize actions like DoS attacks that do not require passing security
barriers, see supra text accompanying note 81; Kerr, supra note 67, at 16oo, this de-
finition would appear to clear up the public/private cyberspace problem on a
technical basis. But see Lemley, supra note 208, at 537-39 (explaining that even a
clear private right in cyberspace could be heavily qualified in ways similar to those
in which a fee simple interest is qualified in physical space).
213. The absence of a concept of physical proximity on the Internet means that a move
toward privatizing cyberspace has disproportionately negative effects on the pub-
lic character of cyberspace. See Lemley, supra note 208, at 536-37. But see Kreimer,
supra note 124, at 152 (observing that search engine result pages and similar
domain names function as "informational neighborhood[s]" in which activists
can position their web pages "near" the object of their protest).
214. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Pub-
lic Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986) (contesting the notion that public prop-
erty always creates a "tragedy" of the commons and describing a "comedy" of the
commons defined by community interactions that produce value with potentially
increasing returns to scale).
215. See id. at 778 (19 86) (identifying recent hints that "property used for political
speech has come to be viewed as inherently public").
251
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
rences for some content and not for other content."' Nevertheless, the genera-
tive quality of the Internet is distinctly different than Rose's comedy in that a
generative space prioritizes individual freedom over community formation.
Zittrain describes generativity as "a function of a technology's capacity for lev-
erage across a range of tasks, adaptability to a range of different tasks, ease of
mastery, and accessibility." 17 While each of these attributes is potentially con-
ducive to the formation of communities, none of them is inherently about
shared experiences.
Conversely, in the analysis of British customary doctrine upon which Rose
builds her comedy, she describes how customary public activities are valuable
not just for their interactive quality but also for their capacity to anchor com-
munity identity in particular public places."' Cerebrally, it makes sense to
describe the aggregate excitement of individuals participating in a maypole
dance as a product of "increasing returns to scale," but, viscerally, this scene is
more about the fact that there was one source of excitement and that it was
shared by a defined community. 9 The Internet is unique in that an untold
number of individual interactions can seemingly merge to form a cloud of
community activity. For the individual person, however, the experience is inh-
erently isolated. The rapid pinging of information back and forth between indi-
viduals across a distance is revolutionary, but it cannot provide an alternative to
the emotional basis for relationship formation that occurs when individuals
sharing public spaces engage in immediate mutual recognition.2 2 0 Such mutual
216. See Zittrain, supra note 196, at 1994 (noting how quickly the "generative grid" can
channel public preferences, vaulting certain applications and services to a high
level of success and popularity very soon after implementation).
217. Id. at 1981.
218. See Rose, supra note 214, at 759 ("[T]he location of customary public activities
may matter a great deal, not because it would be impossible to conduct these ac-
tivities elsewhere, but because to relocate would rupture the continuity of the
community's experience and diminish the significance of the activity itself. The
community's custom signals its emotional investment in a place. Moreover, the
custom communicates this information to everyone-including the property's
owner who, under British customary law, acquiesced in that investment.").
219. See id. at 767-68 ("Activities of this sort may have value precisely because they
reinforce the solidarity and fellow-feeling of the whole community; thus the more
members of the community who participate, even if only as observers, the better
for all.").
220. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, J.
DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1995, at 65, 75, available at http://www.unbc.ca/assets/
politicalscience/class materials/200905/bowling-alone.pdf (suggesting that the
"technological transformation of leisure" could disrupt opportunities for
social-capital formation by offering the individual fuller satisfaction of her tastes
"at the cost of the positive social externalities associated with more primitive
forms of entertainment"). One commentator writing on this subject acknowledg-
es that online interaction could enhance community in physical space. Ultimately,
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recognition is essential to the deliberative-democratic dialectic"' that engen-
dered one of this nation's most revered moments of change.
Trying to force-fit a concept of civil disobedience into cyberspace inspires
an intuitive response: Physical protest is personal, server downtime is not."' In
a DOS attack, no one will be challenged by the emotionally charged sight of
physical "bodies ... laying [the protestors'] case before [the community's] con-
science."2 2 Even so, server downtime can cause real damage to the target's
self-expression or economic well-being, especially when the targeted entity
relies on the Internet to convey its message or survive financially. DoS attacks
are thus the perfect example of why commentators should be careful to decon-
struct loaded concepts like "protest" or "free speech" before celebrating the In-
ternet's openness.22 4 These attacks exploit that openness"' through actions that
are antithetical to effective political protest like civil disobedience: While shying
however, she agrees with Putnam as to the irreplaceability of physical interaction
in building social capital. She presents President Barack Obama's run for office as
an example of how the Internet served civic engagement insofar as it enabled
latent physical communities to organize for the election. See Nicol Turner-Lee,
The Challenge of Increasing Civic Engagement in the Digital Age, 63 FED. COMM.
L.J. 19, 24,31 (2010).
221. "Dialectic" here refers specifically to the type of personal argumentative exchange
that begins when a protestor expresses her message with conviction during effec-
tive civil disobedience. See supra text accompanying notes 182-183.
222. Putting technology between the attacker and the target reduces the extent to
which the attacker must personally invest in the violence. See supra note 189. As a
result, the attack fails to recreate the human experience accompanying more palp-
able and directly confrontational forms of violence. Cf Jane Mayer, The Predator
War, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, at 36, 40, available at http://archives
.newyorker.com/?i=2009-10-26#folio=036 (warning that Predator drone strikes in
the War on Terror are "seductive" in part because they hide the human cost of
violence (quoting Peter W. Singer) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
223. King Letter, supra note 175.
224. Cass Sunstein, for example, can only explain why an "electronic town meeting"
fails to live up to the founders' aspirations once he has established why a delibera-
tive-democracy model is superior to a marketplace-of-ideas model in understand-
ing the importance of the First Amendment. See Cass R. Sunstein, The First
Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1786-87 (1995). See generally Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) (identifying key
aspects of a deliberative view of democracy, such as the desire for consensus and
the normative focus on evaluating political practices, which are inherent in repub-
licanism and serve to distinguish such a view from a perspective of free speech
that employs marketplace metaphors).
225. Zittrain acknowledges that it is the very generativity of the Internet that creates
the potential for viruses and other malicious interference with the rights of others.
See Zittrain, supra note 196, at 1995-96.
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away from a real public forum, attackers manage to reach through the world's
broadband cables to commit violence against targets silently.
When the waitress at the Greensboro Woolworth's lunch counter claimed
that blacks were not welcome "here," she invoked the idea of place in a way that
was highly dissonant to the students. "Here" was a department store that served
blacks at one counter but not another. "Here" was also a city in the New South
that some considered to be "free of old prejudices and ideally prepared to lead
the region toward new levels of prosperity and enlightenment.""22 The contra-
dictions inherent in the segregation of that lunch counter were apparent only
because of the ways that the community had already begun to integrate in phys-
ical space. The Civil Rights Movement relied greatly on the television to project
images of nonviolent resistance to places far from Greensboro,2 7 but those
images would not have been compelling if nonviolent tactics had not first been
potent in the place where they were carried out. In the words of one student
organizer, "[PIrobably the most powerful weapon that people have literally no
defense for is love, kindness.nz28 And while one can speak of such a weapon over
a broadband connection, the weapon is most effective when used in person.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that DOS attacks are an underappreciated threat to
speech, infrastructure, and the economy and that they serve as an example of
the evolving means by which Internet users can employ otherwise benign tech-
nologies to do harm. While the categories of conduct proscribed by cybercrime
statutes can be stretched to include DOS attacks, the most coherent legal prohi-
bitions on such attacks employ language criminalizing actions taken with the
intent to effectuate denial of service. This focus on the harm itself as the anchor
of legal regulation is important in a rapidly evolving cyberspace because it
forces legislators and courts to identify core values in need of protection and the
harms that could threaten them. The DOS phenomenon also demonstrates the
danger of subordinating concerns about the quality of speech to the protection
of the generative character of the Internet, as it is that character that could
threaten a more fundamental, deliberative tradition of expression that enhances
democracy in the physical world.
226. Flowers, supra note 159, at 53 (quoting WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL
RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 5
(1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
227. See Theodore Carter Delaney, The Sit-In Demonstrations in Historic Perspective, 87
N.C. HIsT. REV. 431, 437-38 (2010).
228. RAINES, supra note 154, at u16.
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